S. Sankarasubban, J.

These appeals are filed against the judgment in A.S. No. 95 of 2001 and A.S.No. 37 of 2001 of this Court. Appeals were filed on 14.8.2002 and they were filed against the judgment dated 12.4.2002. Office raised objection that appeals were not maintainable in view of Sec. 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The matter was placed before the Bench.

2. Learned counsel for the respondent brought to our notice a Full Bench decision of this Court in Kesava Pillai v. State of kerala – 2004 (1) K.L.T. 55, wherein it has been held that no further appeal under S.5 (ii) of the Act is maintainable from the judgment, decree or order passed by a single Judge under S. 3 (13)(b) after 1.7.2002 in view of the amended Sec. 100A of the C.P.C. inserted by Act 22 of 2002.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Full Bench decision has not considered the question whether the amendment is retrospective or not. According to the learned counsel, the amendment is prospective and hence, the appellant, as a matter of right, is entitled to file appeal before the Division Bench Under Sec. 5 of the Kerala High Court Act. Learned counsel for the appellant also cited various decisions to show that the right of appeal is substantive and that cannot be taken away unless there is express provision for that.

4. After hearing both sides, we are of the view that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. The Full Bench decision shows that this question was also considered by the Full Bench in the decision reported in Rajalakshmi Associates (A Firm) & Ors v. M/s. Sree Meenakshi Papers (A Firm) & Ors. – 2003 (2) K.L.T. 225. As a matter of fact, in paragraph 18 of the Full Bench decision, this question is dealt with. It says as follows:

“The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has argued that the right of appeal is a substantive right and the same accrues to a party on the date of the starting of the lis. It is argued that the right of appeal accrues to a party on the date on which the reference is made by the Land Acquisiton Officer to the Court or the date on which a party files a claim petition. It is argued that the right of appeal is a vested right and it cannot be taken away by an amendment to the procedure. As we have already stated, the statute only provides for one appeal to the High Court. A Second Appeal was possible only in view of the provision contained in S.5 (ii) of the High Court Act. That right was taken away by the Amendment Act 22 of 2002. Since such an appeal was possible only in view of the provision contained in S.5(ii) of the High Court Act, we are of the view that the amendment of S.100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, no litigant can have a substantive right for a further appeal after 1.7.2002 on the ground that the proceedings from which that appeal arises was initiated prior to 1.7.2002”.

In the same judgment, the Full Bench has referred to a decision in Salem Advocate’s Bar Assn. V. Union of India-2002 (3) K.L.T. 920. It says as follows:

“S. 100-A deals with two types of cases which are decided by a single Judge. One is where the single Judge hears an appeal from an appellate decree or order. The question of there being any further appeal in such a case cannot and should not be contemplated. Where, however, an appeal is filed before the High Court against the decree of a trial court, a question may arise whether any further appeal should be permitted or not. Even at present depending upon the value of the case, the appeal from the original decree is either heard by a single Judge or by a Division Bench of the High Court. Where the regular first appeal so filed is heard by a Division Bench, the question of there being an intra-Court appeal does not arise. It is only in cases where the value is not substantial that the rules of the High Court may provide for the regular first appeal to be heard by a single Judge. In such a case to give a further right of appe