Ramachandran, J.

The order passed by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kasaragod dated 21-3-2003 in M.C.No.39 of 2001 is challenged by the respondent former husband. The petitioner was the divorced wife. She had filed an application under Section 3(1) (a) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 [Act 25 of 1986] (hereinafter referred as the Act). The Court held that the wife was to get maintenance at the rate of Rs.1,500 for the three months duration of iddat observed by her and Rs.90,000 being a reasonable and fair provision for her. Claim for mahr, as coming under Section 3(1)(c) was upheld and the respondent was also to give back properties, which had been received at the time of marriage, in view of the claims that had been put under Section 3(1)(d) of the Act.

2. The application for maintenance had been filed on 13-6-2001. By the above time, she had got remarried, and though the exact date is not made available, it was on a date before 17-6-2000. According to the former husband, this circumstance was highly relevant in the adjudication process, and reliance had been placed on the decision of this Court in Rasiya v. State of Kerala 2002 (2) K.L.T. 825. However, the learned Judge found that a dictum in an earlier decision, viz. Nizar v. Hyrunneesa 1999 (1) K.L.T. 709 was to the effect that such remarriage was of little consequence while determining the claims under Section 3 of the Act. Since the later decision had drawn sustenance from a decision rendered by the Supreme Court during the year 2001 David Latifi v. Union of India 2001 (3) K.L.T. 651 (S.C.) and two earlier Division Bench decisions of this Court would have gone against the view taken in Nizar's case, although he was inclined to accept the law as proposed, Mr. Justice Basant was of opinion that the area of conflict could be considered by a Bench for an authoritative pronouncement. This was how the matter came up before us.

3. The decisions of this Court, Nizar v. Hyrunneesa 1999 (1) K.L.T. 709 and Rasiya v. State of Kerala 2002 (2) K.L.T. 825 pertain to the claims adjudicated under Section 3 of the Act. In a nutshell, the issue was as to whether the subsequent marriage of the divorced woman was reckonable in the matter of prescribing the amount of maintenance and the fair provision, referred to in the section. In Nizar's case, the learned Judge had expressed the view that this had no relevance. Although the above view had been brought to the attention of the learned Single Judge, while Rasiya's case was being decided, preferring to follow the observations which had been made by the Supreme Court in Danial Latifi's case (cited supra), the learned Judge held that the incidence of marriage in fact was to be taken notice of while adjudicating such claims.

4. The reference order is comprehensive. The learned Judge posed the question as to "whether a divorced woman is entitled to receive anything more than the arithmetical equivalent of the maintenance which she would be entitled from the date of divorce to the date of remarriage under Section 3(a) of the Act". Advertence had been made to the background of the legislation Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum 1985 Crl. L.J. 875 (S.C.) with particular reference to Danial Latifi. The learned Judge had been of the view that the observations in Nizar's case would have been more in consonance with the principles of social justice, and the restrictive meaning given in Rasiya's case perhaps were to be subjected to a reconsideration.

5. The marriage between the parties in the present case had been solemnized on 31-8-1995, in accordance with Muslim rites. The wife claimed that in March, 1996 she was forced to leave the husband's residence because of threat and she had thereafter never gone or lived with him. She came to know that thereafter he had married another woman. Her former husband was having sufficient means and was employed in the Gulf countries. As he was refusing to provide her, during