R. Bhaskaran, J.

This appeal is filed by the defendant in a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaint schedule property with its adjacent land belonged to the defendant. She executed an agreement on 20.4.1993 for sale of 20 cents for a consideration of Rs.70,000/- out of which Rs.50,000/- was paid as advance. The sale was to be executed on or before 14.5.1993 after receiving the balance consideration. The title deed of the property, tax receipt and encumbrance certificate were also handed over to the plaintiff. Possession was also given to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was always ready and willing to execute the sale deed. Since the defendant was not ready to execute the sale deed, a letter was sent by registered post and no reply was sent to the plaintiff. The plaintiff went to the Sub Registry Office on 14.5.1993 for paying the balance consideration. But the defendant did not turn up. On these averments, the suit was filed.

2. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the execution of the agreement is admitted. According to the defendant, it was intended only as a security for the loan of Rs.50,000/- received on 2.4.1993 on the strength of a promissory note for Rs.50,000/- and a cheque for Rs.50,000/- issued to the plaintiff on the same day. The plaintiff also pressed for execution of a karar as security for the loan. The agreement was executed in the presence of mediators on 20.4.1993; There was no demarcation or measurement of the property and possession was not given to the plaintiff. The property is lying as a contiguous plot with the admitted property in the possession of the defendant. The plaintiff was not entitled for specific performance. The notice alleged to have been sent on 8.5.1993 was not received by the defendant.

3. The Trial Court framed the following issues:

i) Whether the specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 20.4.1993 is, allowable?

ii) Whether the document dated 20.4.1993 was only a security for the loan, as alleged in the written statement?

iii) Reliefs and costs.

The Trial Court found that the mediators named in the written statement were not examined by the defendant. The Trial Court also believed the evidence of PW.2 the scribe of Ext.Al to come to the conclusion that Ext.Al was a genuine agreement for sale of the property. The Trial Court also found that the husband of the defendant had earlier borrowed amount from the defendant without any security and therefore the contention that Ext.Al was executed as security cannot be believed. The Trial Court also found that it was probable that the plaintiff was in possession of the plaint schedule property on the date of agreement. It was also found that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement. The Trial Court also considered the question whether it is a fit case where the discretion for grant of specific performance is to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff. Since the defendant subsequently sold a portion of the property to a stranger, the Trial Court found that there was no reason for not enforcing the agreement in favour of the plaintiff also. In that view of the matter, the Trial Court granted a decree for specific performance.

4. In this appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant advanced two contentions. The first was that Ext.Al was in fact executed only as a security, and the second contention was that even if it is to be found that it was an agreement for sale, it is not a fit case where the discretion has to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff and that the Trial Court did not exercise its discretion properly under S.20 of the Specific Relief

Act.

5. The points for consideration in this appeal are (1) Whether Ext. Al was intended only as security and (2) Whether the discretion under S.20 of the Specific Relief Act has been properly exercised by the Trial Court.

Point No.1

6. The definite case of the defendant is that s