1. The Human Rights Protection Forum has filed this petition with the prayer that the notifications dated October 26, 2002 and March 6, 2003 embodying the Ordinances and the Act regarding imposition of court fee in the State of Kerala be quashed.

2. We have heard Mr. Joshi N. Thomas, learned counsel for the petitioner. He has contended that the action of the State Government in enhancing the court fee is arbitrary. The provision that the State need not pay the court fee suffers from the vice of discrimination. Lastly, it has been contended that the imposition of a court fee of Rs. 100/- for every contempt petition is also unfair. On this basis, it is contended that the two notifications deserve to be quashed.

3. Admittedly, the two notifications embody legislative enactments. It has not even been suggested that there was lack of legislative competence. The whole complaint is based on Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.

4. It is recognized that Legislature is the best judge of the needs of the people as made manifest by experience. The burden of proving that an enactment is invalid lies on the person who levels the challenge. In the present case, nothing has been pointed out from the record which may even remotely suggest that the imposition of court fee in the matter of various categories of cases is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly correct that justice is a constitutional promise. It is also true that courts have been described as temples of justice. Yet, the Constitution permits the Legislature to pass laws relating to the imposition of court fee. As to what should be the rate of court fee has to be determined and decided by the Legislature. The Court can be called upon to arbitrate only when it is demonstrated that the measure is wholly unjust and unfair. In the present case nothing has been pointed out which may indicate that the imposition of court fee is arbitrary. Resultantly, the first contention as raised by the counsel cannot be sustained.

5. Mr. Thomas submits that the provision in the statute which exempts the State Government suffers from the vice of discrimination.

6. It is undoubtedly true that S.73(a) of the Court Fees Act provides that "where a suit, appeal, revision, review or other pleadings or documents is filed or presented by or on behalf of the Government or its officers in their official capacity before any court, no court fee shall be chargeable ....". However, it is not disputed that the court fee goes to the State exchequer. If the State is called upon to pay the court fee, it shall be virtually paying itself. It appears that the provision has been made with the sole object of reducing the work load. In economic terms, it shall not be of any substantial consequence. In fact, it results in saving of time and expense.

7. Mr. Thomas, relies upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (AIR 1987 SC 1353), to contend that the State has to be treated as par with any other litigant. It is undoubtedly so. When the Court is examining the validity of any claim filed by the State, it has to be treated like any other litigant. However, the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the context of the condonation of delay cannot be read to mean that any provision exempting the State from payment of court fee or tax would be violative of Art.14. In fact, since the State itself collects the court fee, its position is totally distinct from that of an ordinary citizen. This classification has a reasonable nexus with the ultimate object of the exemption which is saving of time and expense. Thus, even the second contention cannot be sustained.

8. Lastly, it has been contended that imposition of court fee of Rs. 100/- for contempt of court cases is arbitrary.

9. Mr. Thomas has submitted that Art. 215 of the Constitution of India empowers the High Court to punish a person for contempt. When a citizen approaches the Court with