The State/first respondent in the O.P. seeks review of my judgment dated 13th February, 2003 since clarified by me by order dated 5.3.2003 in C.M.P.13097/03. Under judgment dated 13th February 2003, I had afforded an opportunity to the revision petitioner, who is claimant in a land acquisition reference case to examine a witness competent to speak about a particular document which was sought to be relied on by the second respondent-Kerala Water Authority, the requisitioning authority on certain conditions. The opportunity given under judgment dated 13.2.2003 was to examine one of the parties to the particular document. Later, under the order of clarification, the expression one of the parties to the particular document was corrected as either the son of the executant of the document who is the attestor of the document or any other person who is closely acquainted with the execution of the document.

2. Review is sought essentially in respect of the correction or clarification made by me under order dated 5.3.2003 in C.M.P.13097/03.

3. Heard the Government Pleader Smt.M.Lalitha Nair for the review petitioner and Sri.Gopalakrishna Kurup, learned counsel for the first respondent-claimant, the petitioner in the O.P. Significantly, there is no representation for the requisitioning authority-Kerala Water Authority who should have been more concerned about the matter. Smt.M.Lalitha Nair submitted that the order of clarification under which permission has been given to examine the attestor of the document or any other person acquainted with the execution of the document is contrary to the decision of this Court reported in Raveedranatha Menon & Another v. Leelamma (199(1) KLJ 352) and also to the express provisions of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act which prohibits adducal of oral evidence in variation of the terms of the written document. Learned counsel also submitted that in as much as the order of the learned Judge, North Paravoor, against which the O.P. was filed by the first respondent does not suffer from any apparent errors, I over-stepped by my jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in interfering with the said order.

4. I cannot agree. The decision of this Court in Raveedranatha Menon & another v. Leelamma (supra) as well as the decisions of the Supreme Court in Raval & Co. v. Ramachandran (1974) 1 SCC 424) and Mohinder v State of Haryana (1974) 4 SCC 285) dealt specifically with the admissibility of oral evidence against the express terms of the recitals in written agreements unregistered and registered in the context of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 91 is subject to exceptions and explanations and explanation No.3 does permit oral evidence in a limited sphere. Section 92 is the section which deals specifically with exclusion of evidence regarding oral agreements varying the terms of documents which are required by law to be registered in writing. Section 92 is subject to as many as six provisos and to the extent allowed by the provisos, oral evidence can be adduced. In the instant case as Sri.Gopalakrishna Kurup submits oral evidence was sought to be adduced not to show that the price shown in that document is not the price that was paid and received, (though it may be possible for a claimant to argue on the authority of M/s.Anamalais Bus Transport Pvt. Ltd., Chalakudy v. D.Ramakrishna Pillai and another (AIR 1967 Kerala 225) that it is notorious that people will undervalue documents of sale atleast for the purpose of saving on stamp duty) but the purpose of the examination was to give evidence regarding the special or compelling circumstances under which the property in question had be sold for the value shown in the document. To that extent, notwithstanding Section 92 there is scope for oral evidence in the context of registered documents. As indicated by me above, the grievance of the Government is in that I permitted examination of the attestor of the d