R.Basant, J.

The accused is the petitioner. He prays that the criminal prosecution initiated against him by the 2nd respondent/ complainant under S.420 of the Indian Penal Code may be quashed.

2. The complainant had initiated proceedings by filing a private complaint. The gist of the allegations raised by him in the complaint is that the accused had indulged in the offence of cheating. It was a transaction in landed property. The accused had obtained prpperty under Ext.P3 document in the year 1973. He claims to be in possession of the remaining extent of property. He induced the petitioner to believe that the remaining extent- an extent of 91/2 cents is available with him. Making the accused/his mother believe that he has 91/2 cents of 12 cents acquired by him under Ext. P3 after excluding the 21/2 cents sold by him, he induced him to pay the price thereof and take Ext.Pl assignment in the name of the mother of the complainant. The mother of the complainant died and the complainant is the legal heir of his mother. The complainant has now come to realise that the accused had fraudulently suppressed the execution of Ext.P8 document prior to the execution of Ext.P1 document. Under that document Ext.P8, the accused had transferred 3.75 cents of land to another. In short, the contention is that while entering into the sale transaction with the mother of the accused, the accused had fraudulently suppressed the fact that he had already assigned 3.75 cents of land under Ext.P8 to another and had made a false representation that the entire property acquired under Ext.P3 less 21/2 cents which he had already assigned do belong to him and was in his exclusive possession. On coming to know Ext.P8, the de facto complainant had preferred the complaint.

3. Pre-charge enquiry was conducted. After adducing evidence, the learned Magistrate considered the question whether the accused is entitled to be discharged. The Court came to the conclusion that the complainant has succeeded in establishing such a case which if unrebutted would warrant of a conviction. Accordingly, the learned Magistrate did not discharge the accused; but held that the charges are liable to be framed. This order is assailed before me in this proceedings.

4. The nature and quality of the jurisdiction of this Court under S.482 of the Cr.P.C. is well established. In fact, according to me, the accused has certainly a right of revision against the impugned order. Without invoking such right of revision the petitioner/ accused has rushed to this Court. However, since this Court has both concurrent revisional jurisdiction and jurisdiction under S.482 of the Cr.P.C., I do not want to dismiss this petition on the ground that the revisional jurisdiction has not been invoked.

5. The law on the point is well settled. At the stage of S.245(1) of the CrI.P.C., the learned Magistrate is not expected to resort to the exercise of weighing the evidence in golden scale. The learned Magistrate need only consider at that stage whether such a case has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant a conviction. If such a case has been made out, charge has to be framed under S.246 of the Crl.P.C. presuming that the accused has committed the offence. If such a case has not been made out, the accused must be discharged under S.245(1) of the Crl.P.C.

6.The requirement under S.245(1)7246 of the Cr.P.C. has been loosely referred to even by the legal elite/ experts as the requirement of a prima facie case. A Court must always remember that the precise satisfaction contemplated is not that of a 'prima facie case': it of "a case which unrebutted would warrant a conviction". The nature of satisfaction which a Criminal Court is to entertain at various stages of the trial does certainly vary from stage to stage. At the threshold/ initial stage of S.203/204 of the Crl.P.C. the Court has to consider whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused. At the stage of S.245(I) CrI.P.C. the