Radhakrishnan, J.

Writ petition was preferred by the appellant seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P3 revenue recovery notice issued by the Tahsildar for recovery of an amount of Rs.76,138.50 in realization of the decree amount in O.S.No.1064 of 1972 of the Munsiff’s court, Quilon.

2. Suit was instituted by the writ petitioner for a declaration that the initiation of recovery proceedings against it for recovery of damages is illegal. Suit was originally decreed and the same was confirmed by the appellate court. In S.A.No.281 of 1978 judgment was set aside and the trial court was directed to consider the matter afresh. Suit was then dismissed. State took up the matter in appeal, A.S.No.154 of 1981. Appellate court set aside the judgment and later the suit was decreed as prayed for. Writ petitioner then took up the matter in second appeal, S.A.No.1029 of 1989 which was dismissed and the decree has become final.

3. Counsel appearing for the appellant Sri Antony Dominic contended that the State is not entitled to recover the amount since the appellant company is a sick industrial unit falling within the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Counsel submitted that the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction in exercise of the powers under Section 18 (4) read with Section 19(3) of the Act can frame scheme for rehabilitation and the same shall come into force on such date as the Board may specify in that behalf. Placing reliance on Section 22 of the Act counsel submitted that an enquiry under Section 16 is pending for revival of the unit. As per Section 22 when an enquiry is pending under Section 16 or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, notwithstanding anything contained in the companies Act 1956 or any other law, no proceeding for the winding up of the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority, Counsel placed reliance on the decision in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. (1993 (2) SCC 144). Reliance was also placed on the decision of the apex court in Real Value Appliances Ltd v. Engineering Kamgar Sangh (AIR 1998 S.C. 2064).

4. Learned Counsel appearing for the Revenue Sri Raju Joseph on the other hand contended, placing reliance on the decision of the apex court in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals (AIR 1997 S.C. 2027), that the bar applies only to such of those dues reckoned or included in sanctioned scheme for rehabilitation. Appellant has not produced any document or material to show that such amount has been included in the scheme for rehabilitation.

5. We are of the view, the mere fact that an enquiry is pending is no reason to hold that State cannot initiate proceedings for the recovery of the decree debt. The contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner was pointedly considered by the apex court in Corromandal Pharmaceuticals’s case, supra (AIR 1997 S.C. 2027) and held as follows:

On a fair reading of the provisions contained in Chapter III of Act, 1986 and in particular Sections 15 to 22, we are of the opinion that the plea but forward by the Revenue is reasonable and fair in all circumstances of the case. Under the stature, the BIFR is to consider in what way various preventive or remedial measures should be afforded to a sick industrial company. In that behalf, BIFR is enabled to frame an appropriate scheme. To enable the BIFR to do so, certain preliminaries are required to be followed. It starts with the reference to be made by the Board of Directors of the sick company.

The BIFR is directed to make appropriate inquiry as provided in Sections 16 and 17 of the Act. At the conclusion of the inquiry, after notice