2005 Supreme(Ker) 100
Judges : THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN
Mohammed Yeseen, P.P. - Appellant
Versus
The State of Kerala - Respondent
Case No : W.P.(C) Nos. 2554 & 2938 of 2005
Decided On : 02/10/2005
Advocates Appeared :
For the Petitioner: V.A. Muhammed, K.E. Hamsa, Advocates. For the Respondents: M. Rajasree, Government Pleader.
The main legal point established is that the protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India is reserved for educational institutions established and administered by a religious or linguistic minority, and the claim must be based on truth and reality.
Headnote:
Article 30(1) - Educational Institution - Kerala Education Rules - Karunakaran v. D.E.O. Badagara and others 1976 K.L.N. 51, Akkarishetty v. Manager, S.R.A.U.P.School I.L.R. 1978 (2) Kerala 14 - S.P. Mittal v. Union of India A.I.R. 1983 S.C.1 - St. John's T.T.I. (for women) v. State of Tamil Nadu (1993) 3 S.C.C. 595 - Haneefa v. Manager, M.A.S.M. High School, Venmanad I.L.R. 1976 (2) Kerala 532 - R.M.B.T. School v. State A.I.R. 1973 Kerala 87 - Managing Committee, M.A.K.A.P.T. Education College v. State A.I.R. 1989 Patna 248 - A.P.C.M. Society v. Govt. of A.P. A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1490
Fact of the Case:
The case involved the appointment of a Headmaster at a school, where the petitioner was appointed over a candidate who was more qualified as per the Kerala Education Rules.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the institution did not qualify as a minority institution under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, and upheld the government's decision to dismiss the writ petitions.
Issues: The issues included the interpretation of the Kerala Education Rules, the claim of minority status under Article 30(1), and the consideration of relevant documents in the appointment process.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the protection under Article 30(1) is for institutions established and administered by a religious or linguistic minority, and not for institutions with a mere majority of beneficiaries from a minority community. It also highlighted the need for institutions to be educational institutions of the minorities in truth and reality.
Final Decision: The writ petitions were dismissed by the court.
The petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 2554/2005 was appointed as Headmaster of the Viswavidyalayam U.P. School, Chennara by the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 2938/2005, the Manager of the said school. In doing so, Sri George, who is the 5th respondent in W.P.(C) No. 2938/2005 (6th respondent in W.P. (C) No. 2554/2005) was proposed, to be superseded.
2. The appointment of the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.2554/2005 in preference to Sri George George as Headmaster will admittedly be against Rule 45 in Chapter XIV A of the Kerala Education Rules (the 'Rules' for short), since Sri George George, who is a graduate with B.Ed., is admittedly the candidate to be preferred in accordance with the Rules, over the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.2554/2005, whose qualification is S.S.L.C. with T.T.C. and, therefore, only a non-graduate teacher (see Karunakaran v. D.E.O. Badagara and others 1976 K.L.N. 51 and Akkarishetty v. Manager, S.R.A.U.P.School I.L.R. 1978 (2) Kerala 14.
3. The Manager of the school (petitioner in W.P.(C)No.2938/2005) attempted to justify the preference he made on the ground that the institution is one to which the protection under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India applies and therefore, it has a right to establish and administer educational institutions of its choice and that the fight to appoint Headmaster of its choice is part of its such right to administer. In support thereof, the Manager appears to have pressed into service, the approved bye-laws of the management, as sanctioned by the competent statutory authority. After adverting to and considering the terms of the said bye-laws, the Government, by the impugned Order, G.O.(Rt.) No. 5110/2004/G.Edn., dated 29-11-2004, held that the claim as to minority status is not established.
4. As already noticed, the Manager and the teacher, whose appointment as the Headmaster is thus interfered with by the statutory authorities, including the Government, are challenging the said Government order in these writ petitions. They are represented by same counsel.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as also the learned Government Pleader on notice.
6. In the realm of procedure, the learned counsel for the petitioners pressed two grounds.
7. Firstly, it is urged that Sri Askar Ali (petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 2554/2005), the teacher, whose appointment has been interfered with, was not heard by the Government and this amounts to infraction of the directions contained in Ext.P-6 Judgment dated 10-6-2004 issued by this Court in W.P. (C) No.17167/2004. In so far as this issue is concerned, it is to be noticed that the Government was deciding only the revision petition filed by the Manager challenging the decision of the A.E.O. and the D.E.O., refusing to approve the appointment of Sri. Askar Ali. Sri Askar Ali had not carried any revision before the Government on the said issue. Ext. P-6, the Judgment in W.P. (C). No. 17167/2004 was rendered by this Court on a writ petition filed by Sri George George and the direction therein was that the revision shall be disposed of after hearing the affected parties. I am sure that the said direction, by itself is no sufficient ground for this court to interfere in exercise of writ jurisdiction on the ground that the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 2554/2005 was not heard by the Government. This is more so because, the Management was heard by the Government and the only question that was in issue before the Government was as to whether the Management had the protection of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. Having heard the Manager and the issue having been considered and decided by the Government with reference to the relevant materials, the mere non hearing of the teacher, in relation to whose appointment the matter was heard, would not matter much. At any rate, in the realm of discretion, I am not inclined to issue a writ interfering with the impugned decision on this ground.
8. Secondly, it is urged that though Ext. P-1 Deed of T