Koshy, J.

The question referred for consideration of the Full Bench is whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals have jurisdiction to dismiss an application for compensation filed before them for default/non-prosecution by invoking the powers under Rule 395 of the of the M.V. Rules read with Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Lukose v. Govindan Nair (1990 (1) KLT 378), a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows:

“In other words, the Act and Rules do not empower the claims Tribunal to dismiss an application merely for default of the applicant without arriving at findings and without adverting to reasons after the stage of framing issues.” (paragraph 5)

The Court was of the opinion that after framing issues as provided under rule 379 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’), the Tribunal has no power to dismiss the case for default. In Saramma Scaria and others v. Mathai and another (2002 (2) ILR 191) relying on the decision in Lukose’s case (supra), another Division Bench held as follows:

“In other words, the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules do not empower the Claims Tribunal to dismiss an application merely for default of the applicant without arriving at findings and without adverting to reasons after the stage of framing issues.” (paragraph 7)

2. In the present reference order, the Division Bench was of the opinion that the above view should be reconsidered as relevant rule making Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal were not considered in the above decisions. Rule 21 of the Kerala Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1977 (which remained in force till the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 were framed under the Amended Act) made Order IX CPC applicable to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. Similarly, Rule 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (in short ‘the Rules’) makes the provisions of Order IX applicable to proceedings before the Tribunal. In the reference order it is observed that:

“Thus, there is nothing to show that the existence of the said Rules 21 and 395 were brought to the notice of the said benches. Those rules have not been specifically adverted to or considered. The conclusion that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal cannot dismiss a claim petition for default/non-prosecution is thus reached without considering and taking specific note of the provisions of Order IX CPC particularly Order IX Rule 8 CPC.

But, in the case of Lukose (supra), reference is made to the decisions of the Gauhati High Court in Samsul Huda v. M/s. London and Lancashire Insurance co. Ltd. and others (AIR 1972 Gauhati 35) whrein it was held that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to dismiss a claim application for default of appearance. In the said ruling, the Court has considered similar provisions in the Assam Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules as in rule 21 and rule 395 of the Kerala Rules. Facts of that case is also stated in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the above decision as follows:

“13. On the facts also it appears that the case was fixed for hearing on 30-6-1969 and the claimants filed an application on 26-6-1969 for adjourning the hearing of the case fixed on 30-6-1969. On 30-6-1969 the counsel for the claimants filed his hajira and an application on behalf of the opposite parties also was filed to the effect that the case should be proceeded with and disposed of expeditiously. In the circumstances we hold that the Claims Tribunal in dismissing the claim petition for default acted without jurisdiction. In refusing to decide the issues and make an award, the Claims Tribunal in the instant case failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it under section 110-B and the rules framed thereunder.

14. In the result we quash the impugned order dated 30-6-1969 and direct the Claims Tribunal to proceed with the case in accordance with law after giving opportunities to the parties to produce evidence if they so desire. The