In the absence of a specific statutory provision, the appellate authority is not entitled to entertain an appeal filed beyond the prescribed period of 60 days. There is no inherent right of appeal under the Act, and the Government has no power, express or implied, to condone the delay and entertain an appeal.

Kurian Joseph, J.

In the absence of a specific statutory provision to condone the delay, can an appellate authority be compelled to entertain an appeal filed beyond the prescribed period? When a right of appeal is provided, has the appellate authority got an inherent power or implied power to condone the delay in filing an appeal? Under the provisions of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers' Welfare Fund Act, 1985 (for short 'the Act'), can a time-barred appeal be directed to be entertained treating it as an application raising a doubt? These are the questions posed in this Writ Appeal.

2. The Kerala Motor Transport Workers' Welfare Fund Board (hereinafter referred to as 'the board) is the appellant. The 4th respondent (hereinafter referred to as 'the employer') filed the Writ Petition (O.P.12982 of 2000) aggrieved by Ext. P5 order passed by the Government. By the said order, the Government rejected Ext. P3 appeal filed by the employer against the final determination order (Ext. P2) fixing the contribution payable to the Kerala Motor Transport Workers' Welfare Fund (for short'the Fund'). It can be seen from Ext. P2 that taking into consideration the objections of the employer to the provisional assessment order dated 27.6.1998 in respect of the year 1997-98, the District Executive Officer modified the said order and fixed the contribution payable by the employer as Rs. 32,553/-. It is the case of the employer that though the final determination order is stated to have been passed on 31.8.1998, it was not communicated to him and he came to know of it only when recovery steps were initiated against him and immediately he filed Ext. P3 appeal dated 14.1.2000. Since the appeal was filed beyond the period of 60 days fixed under S.8(5) of the Act, Government rejected the same by Ext. P5 order. It is stated in Ext. P5 that the final determination order had already been despatched by the District Executive Officer on 11.9.1998 and the same was returned with the remarks of the Postal authorities as 'unclaimed' on 23.9.1998. And hence Government took the stand that since the appeal was not filed within the stipulated time, it was liable to be rejected.

3. The learned Single Judge however was of the view that the Government was not justified in their conduct. According to the learned Single Judge, instead of rejecting the appeal on technical grounds, the appeal should have been considered on merits. And hence Ext. P5 was quashed and the Government was directed to consider afresh Ext. P3 appeal. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the Board has filed the Writ Appeal.

4. Sri. K. Balakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that there is no power reserved on the Government under the Act to condone the delay in filing the appeal. In the absence of such statutory powers specified under the Act, the Government was not competent to entertain the appeal filed beyond the prescribed period and hence the learned Single Judge was not justified in directing the Government to consider the appeal which was admittedly filed beyond time, on merits. The learned counsel brought to our notice the decision reported in Prasad v. State of Kerala (1999 (2) KLT 531). That was a case dealing with the provisions of the Kerala Toddy Workers' Welfare Fund Act, 1969- There was a challenge against the provisions of the said Act and the grievance highlighted was that the provisions were unconstitutional in not having provided for the condonation of delay by the appellate authority. Referring to the said contention, the Bench observed as follows:

"As already noticed, the period of limitation has been provided under this special statute. The special statute does not contain a provision making the provisions of S.5 of the Limitation Act applicable. Therefore, the question of condonation of delay invoking that provision does not arise at all. In the instant case, the period has already been prescribed under the statute. There is no inherent right o