The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of legislative provisions, specifically the limitation on the imposition of fine by a Judicial Magistrate of first class under S.29(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the effect of the non-obstante clause in S.142 of the N.I. Act.

1. Leave granted.

2. A Judicial Magistrate of first class, after convicting an accused of the offence under S.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short'the N.I. Act') sentenced him to imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 83,000/-. The conviction and sentence were confirmed by the Sessions Judge in appeal and the revision filed by the convicted person was dismissed by the High Court. When the Special Leave Petition was moved, learned Counsel confined his contention to the question whether the Judicial Magistrate of first class could have imposed a sentence of fine beyond Rs. 5,000/- in view of the limitation contained in S.29(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short'the Code'). As the decision of this Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & Ann, 1999 (3) KLT 440 = JT 1999 (7) SC 558 =1999 (7) SCC 510, is in support of the said contention we issued notice to the respondent mentioning that it is limited to the question of sentence. Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the decision of this Court to the effect that power of the Judicial Magistrate of first class is limited in the matter of imposing a sentence of fine of Rs. 5,000/- is not correct in view of the non-obstante clause contained in S.142 of the N.I. Act. We, therefore, heard both Counsel on that aspect.

3. S.138 of the N.I. Act provides the punishment as imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or fine which may extend to "twice the amount of cheque" or with both. S.29(2) of the Code was referred to in Bhaskaran's decision (supra) which contains the limitation for a Magistrate of first class in the matter of imposing fine as a sentence or as part of the sentence. That sub-section says that "the court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding five thousand rupees, or of both." On the strength of the said sub-section it was held in Bhaskaran's case thus:

"The trial in this case was held before a Judicial Magistrate of first class who could not have imposed a fine exceeding Rs. 5000/- besides imprisonment. The High Court while convicting the accused in the same case could not impose a sentence of fine exceeding the said limit".

4. In order to obviate the said hurdle learned Counsel for the respondent adopted a twin contention. First is that the non-obstante clause in S.142 of the Act is enough to bypass the limitation imposed by S.29(2) of the Code. Second is that even apart from the said non-obstante words in the said provision, S.5 of the Code itself mandated that nothing in the Code would affect any special jurisdiction or power conferred by any other law.

5. We would first consider the effect of the non-obstante clause in S.142 of the N.I. Act. The Section reads thus:

"142. Cognizance of offence.- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),

(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under S.138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;

(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to S.138;

(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of first class shall try any offence punishable under S.138".

6. It is clear that the aforesaid non-obstante expression is intended to operate only in respect of three aspects, and nothing more. The first is this: Under the Code, Magistrate, can take cognizance of an offence either upon receiving a complaint, or upon a police report, or upon receiving information from any person, or upon his own knowledge except in the cases differently indicated in Chapter XIV of the Code. But S.142 of the N.I. Act says that insofar as the offence under S.138 is concerned no court shall take cognizance except upon a complaint made by the payee or the hol