No stay could be granted by any court, including the High Court, under S.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

1. Leave granted.

2. Heard parties.

3. This appeal is against an order dated 25th April, 2001. By this order a Criminal Miscellaneous Petition, under S.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, for quashing an order dated 8th July, 1994 passed by a Special Judge constituted under the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter called the said 'Act') has been dismissed.

4. On 8th July, 1984 the trial court took cognizance against the appellant for offences punishable under S.420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC and S.5(2) of the said Act. The appellant then approached the High Court with Miscellaneous Petition No. 578 of 1984 and got a stay of the trial. Having obtained a stay of the trial the Miscellaneous Petition was got adjourned from time to time. By this method the appellant has successfully delayed trial for 7 years.

5. We find that what has happened in this case is happening in a large number of matters. Corruption in public offices is becoming rampant. When public servants are sought to be prosecuted under the said Act, by filing revisions under S.397 Criminal Procedure Code or by filing petitions under S.482 Criminal Procedure Code, stay of the trials are obtained and parties successfully managed to delay the trials. The stays are granted by courts without considering and/or in contravention of S.19(3)(c) of the said Act. This has an adverse effect on combating corruption amongst public servants. It has therefore become necessary to reiterate the law. We have thus heard this petition only on the question of law as to whether or not trials under the Prevention of Corruption Act could be stayed.

6. Mr. Shishodia submitted that by virtue of S.27 of the said Act, the High Court can exercise all the powers of appeal and revision under the Criminal Procedure Code as if the Court of the Special Judge were a court of sessions. He further submitted that S.22 and 23 of the said Act make it clear that the Criminal Procedure Code would apply to proceedings before the Special Judge in relation to an offence punishable under the said Act.

7. Mr. Shishodia submitted that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under S.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code was distinct from its revisional jurisdiction. He submitted that the Special Court (under the said Act) was subordinate to the High Court. He submitted that the inherent power, vested in a High Court was not circumvented by the limitations which are there whilst exercising revisional powers. He submitted that the power to pass an interim order, like a stay order, was part of the inherent power of the court. He submitted that this must necessarily be so as otherwise the court could not effectively exercise the jurisdiction vested in it.

8. In support of this last submission, he relied upon the case of Income Tax Officer v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi (1969 (2) SCR 65). This was a case under the Income Tax Act. Certain amounts were imposed as penalty upon the assessee for concealment of income and for furnishing inaccurate particulars. The assessee preferred appeals and prayed for stay of recovery of the penalties. The tribunal declined to grant stay on the ground that it had no power to do so. The High Court held that the tribunal had the inherent power to stay and directed the tribunal to dispose of the application for stay in accordance with law. In appeal by the Income Tax Officer, this Court confirmed the findings of the High Court that the tribunal had power to stay recovery. This Court held that the power to stay was incidental to the appellate jurisdiction of the court. It must immediately be noted that there was no statutory provision barring grant of stay.

9. Mr. Shishodia further submitted that both the High Courts and this Court have time and again exercised inherent jurisdiction under S.482 Criminal Procedure Code to quash proceedings even under the said Act. He submitted that it takes a number of years for matters to reach hearing. He submitted that it was absolutely necessary that, d