K. Balakrishnan Nair, J.

The question raised in this Appeal is whether disciplinary action can be initiated against an employee even after his acquittal by the criminal court on the basis of the same set of facts basing on which the criminal prosecution was launched. The brief facts leading to the case are the following:

The appellant is an employee of the first respondent Syndicate Bank. He was suspended by the Bank by Ext. P1 order dated 14.7.1992 on allegations of fraud resulting in withdrawal of Rs. 2,90,500/- from the Bank during the period from 14.2.1991 to 18.6.1992. Information was lodged with the police which resulted in the registration of two criminal cases against him. The Central Bureau of Investigation prosecuted him for the offences under Ss.120B, 381, 419, 420, 468, 471 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code and under S.13(2) read with S.13(1)((d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He faced trial in two cases, CC Nos. 8/94 and 9/94 before the C.B.I. Special Judge, Ernakulam. He was acquitted in both the cases by Exts. P3 and P4 judgments. Evidently, the acquittal was not on merits, but in compliance with the directions of the Supreme Court in Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar UV 1998 (7) SC 1), During the pendency of the criminal cases, the appellant's suspension was revoked by Ext. P2 order. The said order of reinstatement was made without prejudice to the Bank's right to take disciplinary action. After the acquittal in the criminal cases, the Bank served Ext. P5 charge sheet dated 17.6.1999 on the appellant, who thereon requested for time upto 17.7.1999 for submitting his written statement of defence. On 16.7.1999, the appellant filed O.P.No. 17972/1999 seeking to quash Ext. P5 and also for a further direction restraining the respondents from proceeding with the disciplinary action in view of his acquittal. The learned single judge dismissed the Original Petition by the judgment under appeal. The aggrieved appellant, therefore, appeals.

2. We heard Mr. Nandakumara Menon, learned counsel for the appellant. He submitted that since the appellant has been acquitted by Exts. P3 and P4 judgments, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings on the same set of facts is impermissible. Special reference was made to Ext. P2 reinstatement order dated 3.2.1998. In the said order it is stated:

"It is also ordered that the suspension as above is revoked without prejudice to the Bank's right to take disciplinary action against him and to award any punishment as deemed fit in the event of the charges are proved in the Court."

Since no charges are proved, the Bank is precluded from taking any action against the appellant, the counsel emphasises. The decisions relied on by the learned single judge do not apply to the facts of this case, submits the appellant. We were taken through the provisions of the procedure governing disciplinary action contained in Chapter IX of the Bipartite Settlement. Special reference was made to Clause 19.4 extracted in Ground B of the Writ Petition to say that if at all the bank wanted to take disciplinary action, it should have been initiated within one year of the launching of the prosecution. He also contended that the Bank is estopped by issue estoppel/res judicata. He added that the case is a State one, as the disciplinary proceedings are launched after the lapse of seven years after the alleged commission of the offence. By the delay, he is seriously prejudiced.

3. Mr. M.P. Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the Bank relied on Cl. 19.3(c) of the Bipartite Settlement which empowers the bank to proceed against a delinquent employee in disciplinary proceedings, even if he is acquitted by the criminal court. Various authorities were cited by both sides in support of their respective contentions.

4. It is common case that the rules of procedure governing disciplinary action against the appellant are those contained in the Bipartite Settlement. The relevant rules are contained in C1s.19.3 and 19