Srikrishna, C.J.

This appeal impugns the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 5th July, 1994 dismissing the writ petition.

2. The petitioner is an erstwhile shareholder and managing director of a company known as `M/s. Kottayam Textiles Limited'. M/s. Kottayam Textiles Limited was running a textile mill at Ettumanoor in Kottayam District. This textile unit had run into severe financial troubles and was closed for a considerably long period. By a notification dated 6.2.1978 issued under section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act,1951,the Central Government superseded the Board of Directors of the company and appointed an authorized agent to manage the textile unit. Despite the Central Government pumping in large finances, the viability of the textile unit did not show any improvement and, finally, the textile unit and all assets of the company were taken over by an Act known as `The Kerala Sick Textile Undertaking (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1985 (Act 27 of 1985). This Act was reserved for the assent of the President and received assent of the President on 14th October, 1985 and was published in the Kerala Gazette, Extra-ordinary No. 830 dated 15th October, 1985. This Act came into force from 5th October, 1984. By reason of section 3 of this Act, with effect from the appointed day (1st September, 1983) as defined in section 2(a), every sick textile undertaking and the right, title and interest of the owner in relation to every such sick textile undertaking stood transferred to, and vested absolutely in the State Government. Immediately thereafter, the right, title and interest of the erstwhile owner stood transferred under sub-section (2) of section 3 and vested in the State Textile Corporation, which is respondent No. 3 before us.

3. The petitioner challenges the validity of the provisions of the Kerala Sick Textile Undertaking (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act') on several grounds. Though the contentions raised are somewhat diffused and generalized, we have been able to gather that, principally, the validity of the provisions of the Act have been impugned as being violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1) (g) and 21 read with Article 300A of the Constitution.

4. The first contention urged is that, even after the fundamental right to property was deleted from Article 19, as a result of introduction of Article 300A of the Constitution, the State cannot deprive any person of his property save by authority of `law'. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the expression `law' used in Article 300A means a law which is just, reasonable and fair; any law which provides for compulsory acquisition without comensation would be unjust, unfair and inequitable. It is also contended that such compulsory acquisition, without adequate compensation or illusory compensation, would seriously affect the fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution as the right to life encompasses not only a right to existence, but also the right to enjoy property. This contention is not only misconceived, but also not res integra. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the view expressed by certain learned authors in books and articles published by them. He also submitted that those views were amply supported by the judgement of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Basantibai Fakirchand Khetan v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 Bombay, 366), which takes the view that, even after clause (f) was deleted from Article 19(1), the right to property would not vanish, but would merge into and become one with the guaranteed fundamental right under Article 21. Article 21 has been expansively interpreted by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248, and it has been held that a fundamental right under Article 21 cannot be rest