M.R.Hariharan Nair, J.

The question posed before this court by the revision petitioner, who is the accused in C.C.No. 62/1997 of the Judicial first Class Magistrate’s Court, Irinjalakuda, is the scope and ambit of Sec. 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the propriety of making the sentences suffered by him in different cases to be concurrent.

The accused was charged with the offence of house breaking committed at 4.30 a.m. on 26-5-1996 into the dwelling house of P.W.1 and theft of gold chain weighing 40 grams kept under the pillow of P.W.2 and another gold chain weighing 23.930 grams worn by P.W.3. Offences under Secs. 457, 380 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code were alleged against him. He was found guilty, convinced and ultimately sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years under Sec. 457 and rigorous imprisonment for one year under Sec. 380 of the IPC. No separate sentence was imposed under Sec. 379. The learned Magistrate added that these sentences should run consecutively.

Smt. Sahana Karthikeyan, who represented the revision petition on State Brief, submitted that the learned Magistrate went wrong in making a direction that the sentences should run consecutively and that in the nature of the case they should have been made concurrent. In the revision petition the prayer of the petitioner is not merely that the two sentences imposed in the case should be made concurrent; but also that the sentences imposed on him in C.C.Nos.54/97, 65/97 and 160/97 which were cases charged by the Kodungallur Police as also in C.C.Nos. 2/97, 5/97, 7/97, 8/97 and 9/97 initiated by the Irinjalakuda Police might also be made concurrent.

The learned Government Pleader submits that the prayer is absolutely untenable and that this court should not exercise its discretion in favour of a habitual offender like the revision petitioner and that the revision is hence liable to be dismissed.

Two questions that arise in the case, in the circumstances, are:- (i) Whether the sentence imposed in the present case should be made concurrent with the sentences suffered in the various other cases pointed out by the revision petitioner and (ii) whether the two sentences imposed in the case itself should be made concurrent.

Point No. 1:- It is Sec. 427 of the Cr.P.C. which governs the matter. It reads as follows:

“427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence. – (1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.

Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under Sec. 22 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately

(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment of life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.”

In the present case, we are not concerned with the proviso to Sec.427(1) because no one has a case that the revision petitioner was ever imprisoned under Sec. 122 of the Cr.P.C. A reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that the normal rule is that the sentences should run consequently and what is available to the Court is only a discretion to specify otherwise.

Under sub-sec. (1), the date of expiry of the first sentence that the offender undergoes shall be the starting point of the subsequence sentence and so on. Without the court’s d