N. Krishnan Nair, J.

This revision is directed against the order dated 16.5.2002 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kottayam in S.C. 241/2001.

2. The facts necessary for the disposal of this revision may be stated as follows : The petitioner is the accused in S.C. 241/2001 (popularly known as Suryanelli case) on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge Kottayam. He is charged with the offences punishable under Sec. 120(B), 363, 366(A) 368, 332, 373, 376, 376(2)(g), 392 read with Sections 109 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the petitioner submitted a list of 45 witnesses for the defence. The court below by the impugned order allowed him to examine 12 witnesses out of the 45 witnesses and refused permission to examine the remaining 33 witnesses. Aggrieved by the refusal of the court below to permit him to examine all the persons mentioned in the witness schedule, the petitioner has come up with this revision.

3. Heard the counsel for the petitioner and also the Director General of Prosecution. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of the court below is clearly illegal and cannot be sustained either in law or on facts. According to the learned counsel. In order to enable the petitioner to prove that the prosecution has suppressed the truth before the court, it is necessary to examine all the witnesses mentioned in the witness schedule . He further contended that the reasons given by the court below for refusing permission to examine all the witnesses are no reasons at all. On the other hand, the learned Director General of prosecution challenged the maintainability of the revision petition on the ground that the impugned order is an interlocutory order and in view of sub sec. 2 of Sec. 397 of the Cr. P.C., the order is not revisable. According to him the witness schedule is intended only to delay the proceedings and the lower court was fully justified in short listing the witnesses.

4. The first question arising for consideration is whether the impugned order is revisable. Sec. 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. lays down that powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, enquiry, trial or other proceedings. What is an interlocutory order has not been defined in the Cr. P.C. But, the meaning of the words "interlocutory order" in sub Sec. 2 of Sec. 397 of the Cr. P.C. came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in several cases. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977 4 SCC 551), the Supreme Court held that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding cannot be held to be an interiocutory order. The Supreme Court pointed out that there are certain orders which are not interlocutory and which are not final such orders are called intermediate orders. It was also held that in respect of intermediate orders the High Court is not powerless to examine them under Sec. 482 and even Sec. 397(2) is no bar to consider the correctness of such orders. In V.C. Shukla v. State (1980 Supp. SCC 92) it has been held that the term "interlocutory order" used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial and the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi-final. If the examination of a witness is necessary for the defence but the court is not inclined to permit the accused to examine that witness , the order refusing permission to examine that witness would definitely affect the right of the accused. It cannot be said that the High Court has no power to revise such orders in view of the prohibition under sub sec. 2 of Sec. 397 of the Cr.P.C. In this case, the grievace of the petitioner is that examination of all the witnesses mentioned in the wi