The legal principle established is that when a document is declared as conclusive proof by law, the court shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it, except in cases of fraud or collusion.

1. Though the appellants in these two appeals are two different persons it would be advantageous to dispose of these two appeals together by a common judgment, on account of a common factor involving in both cases.

2. When Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 came into force there was prohibition in holding land in excess of the ceiling limit fixed thereunder. Taluk Land Board is one of the authorities under the Act to fix the area of the land in possession of landholders. One Moosakutty Haji made a declaration of the various lands in his possession. (His widow is arrayed as respondent No.1 in these appeals since Moosakutty Haji had died). The Taluk Land Board found that the said Haji had 877.500 acres of land and on its premise determined that the excess land in his possession (beyond the ceiling limit) was 788.72 acres. Moosakutty Haji was directed to surrender the said excess land.

3. While so, the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 3067 of 1997 (the office bearers of Vallambram Juma Masjid) put-forth a claim that an area of 6.82.500 (Sic 682.500) acres of land in Survey No. 629 of Wandoor Amsan was erroneously recorded as the land in the possession of the said Moosakutty Haji. According to the appellants, the said land was leased by the landowner to other persons long before the commencement of the Act and in 1984 the Land Tribunal, Wandoor had granted Certificate of Purchase as per S.72-K of the Act to the tenants thereof. The tenants have gifted the said land to the aforementioned Juma Masjid as per registered documents executed in 1986. Appellants, therefore, contended that the said area should be de-linked from the account of Moosakutty Haji.

4. A similar claim was made by the appellants in C.A. No. 8475 of 1997 on the following facts:

An area of 1.5 acres in Survey No. 357/1 was outstanding on lease with two persons (Krishnan and Achuthan) long before the commencement of the Act and those persons assigned their rights in favour of the appellants. The Land Tribunal issued a Certificate of Purchase in suo mote proceedings No. 88/97. Thus the aforesaid 1.5 acres of land could not have been included in the account of Moosakutty Haji, according to the appellant.

5. It seems the Taluk Board ignored the Certificate of Purchase and counted the aforesaid area of land in the account of Moosakutty Haji and then determined the excess land surrenderable by him. The High Court in revision petition filed by the appellants under S.105 of the Act did not interfere with the aforesaid finding of the Taluk Land Board. Learned Single Judge of the High Court has observed thus:

"In the absence of any material to show any tenancy prior to 1.4.1964 the Taluk Land Board was right in not acting on the Certificate of Purchase issued by the Land Tribunal. Under the circumstances it could not be treated as conclusive. Even otherwise it was not accurate on its face."

6. Similar observations were made about the claim put forward by the appellant in the other appeals also. Ultimately the appellants did not succeed in their claims and hence they have challenged the order of the High Court in these appeals filed by special leave.

7. Shri. T.L. Vishwanatha Iyer, learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that learned Single Judge of the High Court has not taken into account the legal implications of S.72-K of the Act which rendered a Certificate of Purchase as "conclusive proof of the assignment to the tenant of the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, over the holding or the portion thereon to which the assignment relates."

8. When the enactment enjoined that any evidence would be treated as conclusive proof of certain factual position or legal hypothesis the law would forbid other evidence to be adduced for the purpose of contradicting or varying the aforesaid conclusiveness. This is the principle embodied in S.4 of the Evidence Act, when it defined "conclusive proof".

"Conclusive proof - When one fact is declared