K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.

These appeals have been preferred against the common judgment in O.P.Nos. 9914,9792, 10716 of 1989 and the judgment in O.P.No. 7767 of 1993 respectively.

2. Question which arises for consideration in all these appeals is the same. Some of the respondents in these appeals, who are members of the Scheduled Tribes, preferred applications under S.6(2) of the Kerala Scheduled Tribes (Restriction on Transfer of Lands and Restoration of Alienated Lands) Act, 1975, for restoration of their lands. The Sub-Collector issued notices to the appellants against whom complaints were preferred by the members of the Scheduled Tribes. In O.P. Nos. 9792 and 10716 of 1989, the only objection taken was that the applications themselves were time-barred, and therefore, not maintainable. The main objection taken in O.P.No. 10716 of 1989 by the petitioner therein was that she became the owner of the land in question by virtue of a transfer effected by third parties as per the certificate of purchase produced by her. All the applications preferred by the members of the Scheduled Tribes were allowed by the Sub Collector. Ext. P1 is the order in all these cases. The ground of limitation put forward by the appellants in some of the appeals was found unsustainable. Regarding the claim of purchase from third parties made by the petitioner in O.P.No. 10716 of 1989, it was found that the property in question, which belonged to the Scheduled Tribes, was actually encroached upon by the petitioner. It was also found by the Sub Collector that the appellants-petitioners miserably failed to establish their independent title to the property. It was therefore ultimately found that the Scheduled Tribes, who have preferred applications, were entitled to get restoration under S.4 of the Act. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Sub Collector, appellants have preferred appeals before the District Collector. All the appeals were dismissed. Against those orders, Writ Petitions were preferred. Learned Single Judge concurred with the finding of the Sub Collector and District Collector. Aggrieved by the same these appeals have been preferred.

3. When the matter came up for hearing, counsel for the appellants, Sri. E. Subramani, submitted that the provisions of the Act could be invoked only in respect of a transfer as defined in the Act. Reference was made to S.2(g) of the Act, which is extracted below for easy reference:

"'transfer' in relation to immovable property, means an act by which immovable property is conveyed by any documentary or oral transaction, whether by way of mortgage with or without possession, lease, sale, gift or exchange, or in any other manner, not being a testamentary disposition; and includes a charge,' vilapanayam', 'unduruthi', contract relating to immovable property, mortgage, pledge or hypothecation of crops or standing trees on payment of consideration or otherwise, voluntary surrender and abandonment."

Counsel for the appellants submitted that on a reading of Ss.4,5 and 6 of the Act, it is clear that the authorities could invoke the provisions of the Act only in respect of a land which became alienated from a Scheduled Tribe by virtue of any of the processes referred to in the definition of "transfer" as contained in the Act. Counsel further submitted that in the investigation conducted by the authorities, as is evident from the impugned orders, the appellants are found to be trespassers and not transferees of the land from the Scheduled Tribes. Counsel submitted that under such circumstances, the provisions of the Act could not be invoked against the trespassers. It is his contention that the remedy open to the claimants is before the Civil Court.

4. Counsel appearing for the claimants as well as Learned Government Pleader submitted that the definition of "transfer" in S.2(g) of the Act is very wide, which includes abandonment of property as well. According to them, a liberal interpretation has to be given to the expr