The relevant date for competent authority to accord sanction to prosecute under Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is the time when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence.

Accused 2 and 3 in C.C. No. 1/94 on the file of the Special Judge, CBI Court-II, Ernakulam are the petitioners. This petition is filed to quash the entire criminal proceeding initiated against them. Petitioners and 3 other accused persons were tried for the offences punishable under sections 419, 420, 465, 471 and 168 read with Section 120-B, IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, on the basis of the charge-sheet laid by the Inspector of Police, CBI/SPE, Cochin. Petitioners raised several objections before the Special Judge to the effect that the prosecution is invalid for want of proper sanction to prosecute them.

2. It is seen that the prosecution against the petitioner and other accused were launched alleging criminal conspiracy, misappropriation etc. during the period 20-6-89 to 26-2-90. Though all the accused raised objection regarding want of proper sanction to prosecute them, only the petitioners pressed the contention before the learned Special Judge and the learned Special Judge negatived that contention by order dated 8-8-95. Hence this Crl.M.C. is preferred before this Court.

3. Petitioners contended that the appointing authority is the Chairman of the Cochin Shipyard. The Chairman and Managing Director delegated his powers regarding the authority to take disciplinary action including removal from service to the Chief Manager, Ship Repair Operations and Chief Manager (Personnel) and others by order dt. 21-8-86. By order dt. 29-10-91 issued by the Deputy General Manager (Personnel) the above power has been delegated to the Deputy General Manager (Personnel) also. Sanction in respect of 2nd accused in this case is issued by the Deputy General Manager (Training) on 6-4-93 and sanction to prosecute the 3rd accused has been granted by Deputy General Manager (SR-II) on 12-4-93. Therefore the petitioners have contended that the sanction order as contemplated under section 19(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not issued by the competent authority in this case since during the period the offences were alleged to have been committed, the Deputy General Manager (Training) and the Deputy General Manager (SR-II) were not delegated with the authority to exercise the powers. Those contentions were negatived by the learned Special Judge.

4. It is seen that the 2nd accused was appointed as Mechanist Grade-I. He was subsequently redesignated as Mechanist Grade-III. During the period 1989-91, he has been working as Mechanist Grade-IV in training department. The Deputy General Manager (Training) was the Head of the Department in training department at that time. The Chairman and Managing Director by order dt. 10-11-92 delegated disciplinary powers to the Deputy General Manager (Training) and Deputy General Manager (Training) passed the order of sanction of prosecution against the 2nd accused on 6-4-93.

5. The 3rd accused was appointed as the Mechanist Grade-I by the Chairman and Managing Director and that post was re-designated as Mechanist Grade-III. During the period 89-91, he was redesignated as Mechanist Grade-I. The Deputy General Manager (SR-II) was the Head of the Department. The Chairman and Managing Director delegated the disciplinary powers to Deputy General Manager SR-II by order dt. 6-3-92. Therefore, it is clear that the Deputy General Manager (Training) as well as the Deputy General Manager (SR-II) was competent to accord sanction for prosecution against accused 2 and 3 on 6-4-93 and 12-4-93 respectively, the dates on which they granted permission to prosecute them.

6. It is contended that the Deputy General Manager (Training) and Deputy General Manager (SR-II) were not delegated with the powers of disciplinary authority during the period 20-6-89 to 26-2-90 for which the petitioners are prosecuted in this case and, therefore, the sanction accorded by them to prosecute the petitioners is invalid. Counsel for respondents submitted that the material poi