The main legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between the jurisdiction of the District Judge as a District Court under S.61D of the Forest Act and the maintainability of a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. The court emphasizes that the exercise of jurisdiction under Art.226 is not justified, but the decision of the District Judge can be scrutinized under Art.227.

P.K. Balasubramanyan, J.

This Original Petition is filed under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the decision of the District Judge of Trichur in C.M.A. 75 of 1988, an appeal filed under S.61D of the Kerala Forest Act. Appeal under S.61D of the Act is to the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area in which the property to which the order relates has been seized. Under sub-s.2, S.6 ID of the Act an order of the District Judge under sub-s.1 shall be final. At the hearing of the Original Petition an objection was taken on behalf of the respondents that the order challenged was one passed by a civil court and no writ of certiorari can be issued to the civil court and therefore, this Court could not exercise jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. The learned judge after noticing the divergence of opinion in this Court regarding the maintainability of a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India has referred the Original Petition to a Division Bench for decision.

2. We may straightaway notice that nobody had a case that this court could not exercise jurisdiction under Art.227 of the Constitution of India even if the order were deemed to be one passed by the District Court in exercise of an appellate jurisdiction conferred by the statute concerned. It is therefore, clear that this Court has always the jurisdiction to correct the errors amenable to correction under Art.227 of the Constitution of India. But since the question of the maintainability of an Original Petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India has been raised and the question has been referred to the Division Bench, we think that it is necessary to speak on that question before finally deciding this proceeding.

3. The Act merely confers the jurisdiction on the District Judge. When a statute confers jurisdiction on the ordinary civil court unless there is clear intention to the contrary it is understood as conferment of jurisdiction on the civil court even though the statute may designate the judicial officer as the person competent to hear the appeal. Under the Indian Telegraph Act by S.16 jurisdiction is conferred on the District Judge to entertain a claim for enhancement of compensation for the trees cut for the drawing of a line. When a contention was raised that a revision under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not lie against the decision of the District Judge passed in a proceeding initiated under S.15 of the Indian Telegraph Act, this Court held in K.S.E.B. v. C.G. Narayanan (1973 KLT 968) that when a District Judge is called upon to decide a matter relating to compensation for the infringement of a civil right namely compensation for civil trespass that has been committed under the cover of the Telegraph Act he is deciding that question in his judicial capacity as a District Court and since the District Court is subordinate to the High Court a revision under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was maintainable. In Dy. Conservator of Forests v. Sarojini (1981 KLT 179) it was held that the statutory provision in S.61D of the Forest Act was indicative of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction had been conferred on the District Court and not on the District Judge as persona designata. This Court referred to the principle stated in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster General (1913 A.C. 546) to the following effect:

"When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches".

This Court also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in N.S. Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. (AIR 1953 SC 357). In Varkey Abraham v. District Judge (1994 (1) KLT 580) this Court again held that the District Judge while exercising powers under S.6ID of the Forest Act was exercising jurisdiction