An order of eviction cannot be passed if the tenant depends for his livelihood on the income derived from the business conducted in the building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality, as per the provisions of S.11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act.

This C.R.P. is filed challenging the order of the District Court, Thodupuzha in R.C.R.P. 3/98. The petitioner is a tenant and the respondent is the landlord. The landlord filed an application for eviction of the tenant under S.11 (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act. The need alleged was for the purpose of conducting a business for the son-in-law of the landlord. The tenant filed a written statement denying the need alleged. He further contended that he is entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to S.11 (3) of the Act namely, that he was depending for his livelihood on the business which was conducted in the building and that there was no other alternate building available. When the R.C.P. came up for trial, the parties filed a compromise petition. The tenant admitted the bonafide need and the landlord admitted the non-availability of the alternate building and also the hardship of the tenant. As per the compromise petition, the tenant was given five years' time to vacate the premises. On the basis of the compromise petition, the Rent Control Court passed an order of eviction.

2. After the period fixed in the compromise was over, the landlord filed an execution petition namely, E.P. 3/98 before the Munsiff s Court, Thodupuzha for execution of the order of the Rent Control Court. The tenant then contended that the order passed in the compromise petition is a nullity and hence the order cannot be executed. Before the executing court the certified copy of the compromise petition and the certified copy of the order in R.C.P. were produced as Exts. Al and A2. The respondent produced Exts. B1 to B10, out of which Ext. B1 the notice issued to the tenant for eviction and Ext. B 2 is the reply notice. The executing court came to the conclusion that the order of eviction was passed after the court was satisfied that the landlord needs the building for his own need. It also took the view that the tenant also admitted the bonafide need of the landlord. Hence rejecting the contention of the tenant, E.P. was allowed. Against the order in the E.P. the tenant preferred R.C.R.P. under S.14 of the Rent Control Act before the District Court. Learned District Judge confirmed the order of the executing court. It is against the above order that the present C.R.P. is filed under S.115 C.P.C.

3. Sri. K. Ravindranathan Nair, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that both the authorities have not properly understood the contents of the compromise petition and both the authorities erred in coming to the conclusion that the ground for eviction existed. Learned counsel highlighted the clause in the compromise wherein it has been admitted that no other alternate building is available and that if the tenant was evicted at that time it will affect his business. According to counsel, this aspect has not been looked into by the courts below. What the courts below considered is only the fact that the tenant had admitted the need of the landlord. But that is not enough. Under S.11(3) of the Act, the Court can order eviction only if it is satisfied that the tenant has an alternate building- and that he does not depend on the income derived from the business conducted. Hence learned counsel submitted that the decree is not executable.

4. Sri. S. Venkitasubramania Iyer, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, submitted that in the first paragraph of the compromise petition, the tenant had admitted that the landlord bonafide needed the building. But the tenant wanted only time to vacate. As per the agreement five years time was granted. Learned counsel submits that the tenant admitted the claim of the landlord and what he wanted was only some time for vacating the building. Learned counsel submitted that the mere fact that there are statements in the compromise petition regarding the non-availability of the alternate building or the hardship of the tenant does not take away the right of the lan