The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the timeliness of the application for delivery and the necessity of a Succession Certificate in execution of a decree.

Heard both sides.

This revision is by the judgment debtor. It challenges the order of the executing Court overruling two objections raised by the judgment debtor to the execution. In execution of decree for money, the property was sold on 13.3.1978. The judgment debtor filed an application for setting aside the sale by invoking O. XXIR. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That application was dismissed for default and the sale was confirmed. Subsequently, the dismissal of the application was set aside and the application for setting aside the sale was restored. It was thereafter dismissed on merits on 18.3.1981. The judgment debtor challenged that order in an appeal in this Court by riling E.F. A. 7/81. During that appeal judgment debtor obtained a conditional order of stay of further proceedings in execution. When that appeal was pending, certain other interested persons filed applications E.A. Nos. 467,468 and 469 of 1981 (subsequently re-numbered as E.A. Nos. 91, 92 and 93 of 1985) for setting aside the sale. Those applications were entertained by the executing Court. After a trial of those applications the said applications were dismissed on 9.8.1988. The appeal E.F. A. 7/81 filed by the judgment debtor against the debtor in E.A. 28/78, the application under the O. XXI R.90, was dismissed by this Court on 1.1.1991.

2. Meanwhile, the decree holder applied for delivery of the property on dismissal of applications for setting aside the sale E.A. 91, 92 and 93 of 1985. That application for delivery was made on 22.11.1988, in about 3 months of dismissal of the applications referred to earlier. The judgment debtor raised a contention that the application was barred by limitation, since it was not tiled within one year of the confirmation of sale, in terms of Art.134 of the Limitation Act. Certain other objections were also sought to be raised including the objection that the decree holder having died, his legal representatives could seek delivery only after producing the succession certificate. Those objections were overruled by the executing Court and the decision of the executing Court was challenged before this Court in C.R.P. 4-96. This Court held by its order dated 2.1.1996 that in view of the fact that the sale would become enforceable only on 9.8.1988 with dismissal of the applications E.A. Nos. 91,92 and 93/85 and in view of the fact that the appeal E.F.A. 7/81 was dismissed only on 1.1.1991, the application for delivery was in time and could not be held to be barred by limitation. The other objections were also not accepted by this Court. Thus, this Court dismissed the revision. The judgment debtor seems to have filed another application E.A. 70/96 reiterated the objections which had already been overruled by the executing Court and affirmed by this Court. It appears to me that E.A. 70/1996 filed by the judgment. debtor is an abuse of process of Court. A litigant is not expected to go on raising the same objections again and again, even when they have already been overruled by the Court. Entertainment of such repeated objections would go against me very public policy embodied in S.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This application was opposed by the decree holders. The executing Court by its order dated 12.4.1996 held that there is no merit in the contentions sought to be raised by the judgment debtor and that the claims were also barred by resjudicata by the prior order i n execution, affirmed in revision. This order is challenged in this revision by the judgment debtor.

3. On merits, I see no reason to accept the contentions raised on behalf of the judgment debtor. Since the sale became effective only by the dismissal of the appeal on 1.1.1991, dire is no question of the application for delivery being barred by limitation. When an appeal is filed, against the order refusing to set aside the sale, the absoluteness of the sale remains suspended by a virtue of the pendency of the appeal and the decree holder is