C.S. Rajan, J.

The petitioner was first appointed as an Upper Primary School Assistant in the school of the third respondent with effect from 15.7.86. The above appointment was approved by the first respondent. In the staff fixation of the school for 1992-93, there was a reduction of one post for want of strength in Standard II. The petitioner was the junior most teacher in the school. She was also not entitled for protection since she did not have continuous service, for 7 years. Therefore, her services were terminated by the first respondent by order dated 4.7.1992. The petitioner challenged the above order by filing O.P. No. 8958/92 which was dismissed on 14.7.92. The petitioner took up the matter in appeal by filing W. A. No. 715/92. The Division Bench of this Court in CMP No. 5692/92 in W.A. No. 715/92 granted interim stay of termination of the services of the petitioner on 31.7.92. Later this Courtby order dated 31.5.95 vacated the stay. Thus the services of the petitioner were terminated on 29.6.95.

2. By Ext. P3 communication the second respondent informed the third respondent that the petitioner did not have 7 years of service and therefore, she was not eligible for protection as per Ext. P1 Government Order. This Original Petition has been filed to quash Ext. P3. The petitioner has also prayed for a declaration that she has more than 7 years service as on 15.7.95 and therefore, she is entitled to the protection under Ext. P1 Government Order. Thus the short question to be decided in this Original Petition is whether the period from 31.7.92, the date on which the Division Bench of this Court granted interim stay and 31.5.1995, tine date on which this Court vacated the stay can be counted as service for the purpose of calculating the 7 years service needed for promotion under Ext. P1 order.

3. Sri. Abdul Aziz, the learned senior counsel argued that when Ext. P1 refers to only service simpliciter without any qualification, the service rendered by the petitioner under the orders of interim stay passed by this Court must also be counted as service. The learned senior counsel is also armed with a number of decisions including decisions of a Full Bench of this Court.

4. In the ruling reported in Kunhikrishnan Nambiar v. State (1964 KLT 704) a Full Bench of this Court considered the distinction between officiating and substantive service. In that context, the Full Bench observed as follows:

"The word "service" by itself without any qualification would ordinarily comprise all service and the words "whether officiating or substantive" are put in brackets after the word "service" only in order to emphasis that all service, of whatever kind counts".

5. In the ruling reported in Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala (1981 KLT 633) Justice Khalid, as he then was, considered the question whether the qualification of a minimum period of service for the purpose of promotion can include a provisional service. The learned judge observed as follows:

"The words "service" without any qualification means service of any kind. Such service has to be taken into account for purpose of qualification and only for that purpose."

6. A Division Bench of this' Court approved the dictum in Bhaskaran's case (1981 follows:

"It thus becomes clear that whenever the rule making authority felt that it is only regular service that should count, it has chosen to use the expression "regular. As such an expression has not been used and that the only expression used is service', we find no justification to read into the rule the prefix "regular'. That is precisely the view taken by this Court in the decision reported in 1981 KLT 633 (between Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala). That was also a case of the Public Works Department and considered the category of the First Grade Surveyors. It has been observed in that case that the only word used is service, which means service of any kind would entitle the petitioner for being promoted if he has the requisite service to his c