The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act as directory, not mandatory, to balance public interest and the rights of the accused.

Headnote:
Food Adulteration - Interpretation of Rule 7(3) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act - S. 16(1a) and (ii) read with S. 2(1a) and (m) and Rules 44 and 50 - Summary of Acts and Sections: The court discussed the interpretation of Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, along with S. 16(1a) and (ii), S. 2(1a) and (m), and Rules 44 and 50. The court highlighted the duel between 'Directory' and 'Mandatory' interpretations, the role of the statute in preserving pure and edible food, and the balancing of citizen's right to trade with the state's duty to protect food purity.
Fact of the Case:

The Food Inspector filed a complaint against two persons for offences under S. 16(1a) and (ii) read with S. 2(1a) and (m) and Rules 44 and 50 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The first accused was convicted and sentenced, while the second one was acquitted. The appeal of the first accused was successful, and the Sessions Judge upset the conviction and sentence solely on the ground of a delay in delivering the report of analysis as per Rule 7(3).
Finding of the Court:

The court found that the delay in delivering the report of analysis, as per Rule 7(3), was not fundamentally fatal to the prosecution. It held that the rule should be interpreted as directory, not mandatory, to balance public interest and the rights of the accused. The court restored the conviction and sentence of the first accused.
Issues: The main issue was the interpretation of Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and its impact on the prosecution's case. The court also considered the conflicting views on the mandatory or directory nature of the rule and its implications for the accused.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that Rule 7(3) should be interpreted as directory, considering the larger aspect of public interest and the need to balance the rights of the accused. It emphasized that a delay, even if marginal, should not scuttle the entire operation of preventing food adulteration and defeat the object of the Act. The court also highlighted the role of human agencies in the process and the need for reasonable despatch without prejudice to the accused.
Final Decision: The court set aside the judgment of the Sessions Judge, acquitted the accused, and restored the conviction and sentence of the first accused. It declared Rule 7(3) as only directory in character and emphasized the need for sensible judgment based on the totality of circumstances.

Judgment :-

SUKUMARAN, J.

The Food Inspector, Cannanore filed before the Judicial First Class Magistrate there, a complaint against two persons for offences punishable under S. 16(1a) and (ii) read with S. 2(1a) and (m) and Rules 44 and 50 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the Rules framed thereunder. Cow's milk was the food involved in the case. The first accused was convicted and sentenced, while the second one was acquitted. The appeal of the first accused was successful. The Sessions Judge upset the conviction and sentence solely on the ground that there was not a rigorous adherence to the requirements of R. 7(3) of the Rules. The factual details of the finding are : a sample was taken on 24-11-1981 and forwarded to the Public Analyst who received it on 26-11-1981. The report of analysis dated 23-12-1981 was received by the Local (Health) Authority on 11-1-1982. Reckoning the period from 26-11-1981, the date of receipt of the sample by the Public Analyst, stretching up to 11-1-1982, when the report was delivered to the Local Health Authority, the period comes to 46 days. As the Rule stood at that time, the time stipulated for delivery of the report of analysis was only 45 days. Even if it be a delay of one day according to the Sessions Judge, it was fundamentally fatal to the prosecution.

2. The view was challenged in appeal. A learned Judge of this Court, who heard the appeal, noted a conflict in the views expressed by this Court on the issue. The appeal was accordingly, referred for the decision of the Division Bench.

3. The Division Bench, in turn, indicated desirability of an authoritative pronouncement on the question. On a reference made in that behalf, the matter has come up before the Full Bench.

4. Rule 7(3) as it stood at the relevant time may only be extracted :

"The Public Analyst shall, within a period of forty-five days from the date of receipt of any sample for analysis, deliver to the Local (Health) Authority a report of the result of such analysis in Form III :"

5. The duel between 'Directory' and 'Mandatory' is to be witnessed in this case as well. Similar scenes were there earlier and in other places. Many are the landmarks bearing inscriptions of the fight and the emergence of the victorious view. They are too numerous to be recounted.

6. The High Court of Bombay has been uniformly taking a view that the rule is mandatory. The later decisions of that Court, however, merely declare the consistency and continuity of the view taken by that Court. It is good enough for that Court but not necessarily for other High Courts where the decisions do not operate as binding authorities. Sustainable and strong logic alone would appeal to this Court. Such of the recent discourse on the topic as is available from the earlier decision would be considered in its proper setting. Observations of the Supreme Court, in similar but different statutory contexts are available from the following decisions: Tulsiram v. State of M. P., AIR 1985 SC 299 : (1984 Cri LJ 1731), dealing with the interpretation of R. 9A, and with the delay on the part of the local authority vis-a-vis its duties in the context of Sections 11(2) and 13(1). S. T. Officer, Ponkunnam v. K. I. Abraham, AIR 1967 SC 1823 is yet another. Shambhu Dayal v. State of U.P., AIR 1979 SC 310 : (1980 Cri LJ 809) is one such decision. Another decision is Dalchand v. Municipal Corporation, Bhopal, AIR 1983 SC 303 : (1983 Cri LJ 448). A fairly recent one interpreting Rules 17 and 18 (packing and sending of samples and memorandum) is State of Maharashtra v. Rajkaran, 1988 SCC (Crl) 47.

7. As for Kerala, there is a confusing scene about the victorious view, demonstrating as it were, the accuracy of Anatole France's statement that what is good in the opinion of one Judge is bad in that of another. Many decisions have taken the view that R. 7(3) is only directory. Many have taken the other view. Some of the learned Judges have

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