The main legal point established in the judgment is that mere inadequacy of the price fetched at a sale is not sufficient grounds to set aside the sale under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act.

Bhat, Ag.cj.

Second respondent in O.P. No. 5415 of 1983 has filed this appeal.

2. Second respondent's husband obtained a loan from the Kerala Fisheries Corporation, and second respondent stood guarantee for the loan offering her landed property as security. The property was brought to sale invoking the provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968,1 he provisions of the Act having been made applicable to such loans by virtue of notification dated 8-11-1970 under S.71 of the Act. The said sale stood posted to 21-8-1976. It was adjourned subsequently and ultimately to 20-12-1976 on which date the third respondent purchased the property for Rs.12,750/-. The second respondent filed an application before the appropriate officer under S.53(1) of the Act to set aside the sale. No specific order was passed thereon, but it was treated as dismissed. The sale was confirmed on 22-3-1978 under Ext.R2(d) order which states that he has already dismissed the application. The second respondent filed an application before the Hon'ble Minister, as seen from Ext.R2(b), and that was rejected under Ext.R2(d), and he thereupon filed O.P.No.2206 of 1979 in' this Court which was disposed of by judgment, Ext.R2(c). This Court held that an application to the Hon'ble Minister was not a statutory application, and a revision would lie to the Board of Revenue. This Court directed the second respondent to file revision petition before the Board of Revenue, and if it was filed within one month, the Board of Revenue would treat the revision petition as having been filed in time and deal with it on merits. Second respondent filed a revision petition before the Board of Revenue, and the Board of Revenue by Ext.P2 order held that Hie price fetched at the sale was inadequate and insufficient, and on that ground set aside the sale. The writ petitioner who took assignment of the property from the auction purchaser, being aggrieved by the order of the Board of Revenue, filed O.P.No. 5415 of 1983. Several contentions were urged before the learned Single Judge, who set aside Hxi.2 order on the short ground that the sale was not liable to beset aside merely on account of inadequacy of the price fetched at the sale. This judgment is now challenged.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the learned Single Judge was in error in holding that mere inadequacy of the price fetched at the sale would not be aground to set aside the sale. Learned counsel relied on the observation of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Joseph v. Tahsildar, South Wynad, (1979-1985) K.U.C. 270. In paragraph 3 of the judgment, it is observed, after referring to Ss.52 and 53 of the Act:

"In practice, it is only when Hie question d' confirmation is taken up by the Collector

that the occasion for him to scrutinise the relevant records concerned with the proceedings arises; and if, in that process, the Collector finds reason for selling aside the sale, he has both the right and the duly to do so after recording the reasons in writing. Gross inadequacy of the price fetched at the auction, compared to the market price for similar lands, in the locality during the material time, can certainly be a valid ground for setting aside the sale. So also, if there were irregularities in the procedure adopted for conducting the sale, that also would afford a reasonable ground for setting aside the sale"

4. S.52 of the Act enables the Collector to set aside the sale on deposit of correct amount as contemplated therein. S.53 stales, inter alia, that "application may be made to the Collector to set aside the sale on the mound of some material irregularity or mistake or fraud in publishing or conducting il, but, except as otherwise hereinafter provide, no sale shall be set aside on the ground of any such irregularity or mistake unless the applicant proves to the satisfaction of the Collector that he has sustained substantial injury by reason thereof. A plain reading of the provision woul