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1991 Supreme(Ker) 333

Judges : VARGHESE KALLIATH,MANOHARAN
Elizabeth - Appellant
Versus
Francis - Respondent
Case No : CM.P.Nos. 859,930 & 931 of 1991 in S.ANos. 248,264 & 263 of 1991
Decided On : 10/23/1991
Advocates Appeared :
S. Venkitasubramonia Ayyar & T.VAjayakumar For Appellant Pirappancode V. Sreedharan Nair & Government Pleader (A. Shahul Hameed). For Respondents

The court has the discretionary power to enlarge the time beyond the period of 30 days mentioned in the third proviso to S.52 of the Court Fees Act, and the discretion has to be exercised judicially on sound and legal reasons.

Headnote:

Court Fees Act - Interpretation of S.52 - A thorough discussion by the eminent judges shed a volume of clear light on the different shades of the question how to levy court fee when a suitor comes with his paramount civil right to get relief either from the State or from his fellow citizens from an established court. The court has the power to enlarge the time beyond the period of 30 days mentioned in the third proviso to S.52 of the Court Fees Act. It is a discretionary power and the discretion has to be exercised judicially on sound and legal reasons.

Fact of the Case:

The court was faced with the question of the court's power and jurisdiction to extend the time for remitting the 2/3rds of the court fee payable after the admission of appeals. The issue was whether the court has the power to extend the time beyond the period of thirty days if there are sufficient cause shown for entitling the petitioner for an extension of time to pay the balance court fee.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that it has the power to enlarge the time beyond the period of 30 days mentioned in the third proviso to S.52 of the Court Fees Act. It is a discretionary power and the discretion has to be exercised judicially on sound and legal reasons.

Issues: The main issue was the court's power and jurisdiction to extend the time for remitting the 2/3rds of the court fee payable after the admission of appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: The court has the power to enlarge the time beyond the period of 30 days mentioned in the third proviso to S.52 of the Court Fees Act. It is a discretionary power and the discretion has to be exercised judicially on sound and legal reasons.

Final Decision: The court allowed the applications for extension of time for payment of balance court fee in the respective cases.

Judgment :-

Varghese Kalliath, J.

Our learned and noble Brother T.L. Viswanatha Iyer felt some doubt as to the semantics, the drift tenor and impact of S.52 and its provisos of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the act). S.52 of the Act provides for payment of court fee for appeals. For easy understanding of the relevancy of the question, we quote S.52 of the Act:

"52. Appeals:- The fee payable in an appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable in the Court of first instance on the subject-matter of the appeal.

Provided that, in levying fee on a memorandum of appeal against a final decree by a person whose appeal against the preliminary decree passed by that Court of the first instance or by the Court of appeal is pending, credit shall be given for the fee paid by such person in the appeal against preliminary decree. Provided further that one third of the fee payable in an appeal shall be paid at the stage of admission of first appeal and second appeal and the balance shall be paid within such period, not later than fifteen days from the date of such admission as may be specified by the court; in case the appeals are admitted. Provided also that the court may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the period upto thirty days".

2. The question forthrightly posed before us by Justice T.L. Viswanatha Iyer is as to this Court's confines of power and jurisdiction to extend the time for remitting the 2/3rds of the court fee payable after the admission of appeals. Petitioner contended that this Court has got power to extend the time beyond the period of thirty days if there are sufficient cause shown for entitling, the petitioner for an extension of time to pay the balance court fee. We issued notice to the Advocate General. Government Pleader appeared before us and submitted that the view of the Government is that Court's power is not absolutely restricted to extend the time after the first stage to 30 days only.

3. The question was elaborately argued by counsel appearing in these cases. Being a matter which would form the practice of the courts and would be of great importance in so far as this question will crop up every day in the functioning of the court, we feel that we must deal with the question a little elaborately. Though these are petitions concerning extension of time for payment of balance court fee really before us what we see is the entire litigant public in an interpretative polemics. The State is not competing the claim of the petitioners herein, but only aiding the court to interpret the provision in a meaningful, purposive and pragmatic manner so as to ensure the provision capable of granting a relief logically and legitimately entitled to blameless 'sansreproche' litigants before court. Taking this view of the matter, the Government Pleader very frankly and forthrightly submitted that this Court's power is not totally curtailed to the outer limit of 30 days in the matter of extension of time for payment of balance court fee. It was said that it will not promote justice and it will cause failure of the prime devoir behind the scheme of the amendment that was brought out after considerable deliberation over the report of a committee chaired by a former Chief Justice of this Court on the question of the proper levy of court fee. There was a steady and chorus brawl for reducing the court fee payable by the litigant public. The question of quid pro quo and other ancillary and relevant aspects touching the dispensation of justice and the relevance of levying court fee were considered in two far famed significant and lofty decisions of the Supreme Court; A.I.R.1989 S.C 100 (PMA shwathanarayana Shetty v. State of Karnataka) and AIR.1973 S.C. 724 (Secretary, Government of Madras, Home Department v. Zenith Lamp and Electrical Ltd.). A thorough discussion by the eminent judges shed a volume of clear light on the different shades of the question how to levy c































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