The main legal point established is that the jurisdiction of the civil court is limited by the provisions of The Income-tax Act and Certificate Proceedings Rules, and the plaintiff's remedy lies under the specific rules governing tax recovery and property attachment.

The plaintiff in a suit for a decree restraining defendants 1 and 3 (respondents 1 and 3 herein) by a permanent injunction from evicting him from the building situated in the plaint schedule property otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of The Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, is the revision petitioner.

2. The temporary injunction sought for was granted by the trial court. But it was reversed by the lower appellate court by the judgment under attack.

3. A resume of facts requisite and relevant to decide the dispute is given hereunder. The fourth defendant K.T. Thomas was declared a defaulter within the meaning of The Income-tax Act, for short The Act, on his failure to pay the tax within the stipulated period. The assessing authority thereupon forwarded to the Tax Recovery Officer a certificate within the meaning of S.222 of The Act specifying the amount of arrears of tax due from the defaulter and the Tax Recovery Officer, the first defendant (the first respondent herein) served the notice, contemplated under R.2 of The Second Schedule appended to The Act (procedure for recovery of tax) on the defaulter calling upon him to pay the amounts specified in the certificate within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. The defaulter failed to comply with the request contained in the said notice and therefore the Tax Recovery Officer got the building in dispute and the appurtenant land measuring 60 cents in extent attached under R.48 of the Second Schedule. This attachment must be deemed to have come into force on 6-3-1983 though the order of attachment was made only on 8-3-1985, in view of the provisions contained inR.51 of the Second Schedule. The building and the appurtenant land aforesaid were sold in public auction by the first respondent in execution of the certificate and purchased by the third respondent for a sum of Rs. 12,01,000. In the meantime) during the subsistence of the attachment, on 10-10-1984, the defaulter granted a lease of the building to the petitioner as is seen from the registered document No. 1962/84 of the Sub Registry Office, Calicut on a monthly rent of Rs.3500/-. Apprehending that the first respondent would dispossess the petitioner in enforcement of the certificate without recourse to the provisions contained in The Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the petitioner instituted the suit for permanent injunction.

4. The learned counsel for the first respondent Sri. P.K. Ravindranatha Menon argued that S.293 of The Act, the rules contained in the Second Schedule, particularly Rules 9,11 (3) and (6) thereof and also the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962 (Certificate Proceedings rules), particularly Rule 47 thereof expressly bar the jurisdiction of the civil court from deciding the dispute because the same is between WKH defaulter and the Tax Recovery Officer and relating, to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a certificate etc. and as such the suit is not maintainable. Touching upon the merits of the case he submitted that the petitioner has no right to continue in possession because the transaction under which she claims possession, is void as it is hit by the prohibition contained in R.16 of the Second Schedule. Assuming she is in possession, that possession must b» deemed, in the circumstances, to be the possession of the defaulter herself; the Tax Recovery Officer therefore, can ignore the said possession and deliver the property to the third respondent, the purchaser in public auction and if need be, by removing the petitioner in case she refused to vacate the same. That that is possible is clear from R.39 of the Certificate Proceedings Rules. However there was no need to have recourse to the said provision because there was no resistance from any quarter, much less from the petitioner when the purchaser went to the spot to take possession of the property. The learned counsel for the third respondent fully supports the