The right of appeal is a substantive right preserved from the date of the commencement of the action, and a notification should not interfere with pending appeals unless expressly provided.

1. The Government by Notification S.R.O.1631/89 issued under S.18(1) of The Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, for short The Rent Control Act, has conferred on the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the said Act have been extended, the powers of the appellate authorities for the purposes of Rent Control Act, in the said areas. This notification is in supersession of all previous notifications on the subject.

2. I shall now read the notification:

"S.R.O.No.1631/89.-In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (1) S.18 of The Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) and in supersession of all previous notifications on the subject, the Government of Kerala hereby confer on the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the said Act have been extended, the powers of the Appellate Authorities for the purposes of the said Act, in the said areas".

3. This notification was published in the Kerala Gazette on 26th September, 1989. As per this notification, on and from 26-9-1989, the District Judges will be the appellate authorities within the meaning of S.18(1) of The Rent Control Act.

4. On the coming into force of the notification there arose a question as to whether the appeals pending before the Subordinate Judges on whom the Government by the previous notification had conferred the powers of the appellate authority within the meaning of S.18(1), should be made over to the District Judges. The High Court on the administrative side issued an Official Memorandum No.D1-46682/86 dt. 8-9-1989, the relevant portion therefrom reads thus:-

" When the notification comes into force, the Subordinate Judges will send the records of the pending cases to the concerned District Judges after issuing notice to the counsel/ parties requesting them to appear before the transferee court on the dates specified therein; under intimation to the High Court. The District Judges will take up the cases on the notified dates and pass appropriate orders".

5. The learned counsel representing the parties submit that inasmuch as the notification is not retrospective in operation, the notification will not apply to the appeals pending on the coming into force of the notification before the Subordinate Judges and if that be so the direction given by the High Court on the administrative side that the Subordinate Judges shall transfer all the pending appeals to the District judges is not sustainable.

6. Before I consider the above argument of the learned counsel I shall endeavour to recapitulate the law on the subject. It is axiomatic that every new enactment could affect future and not the past-Nova constitutio futuris forman imponere debet non proeteritis. In other words the presumption is not to give retrospective effect to a statute. The right of appeal is more than a matter of procedure; on the other hand, it is a substantive right. The legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that the right of appeal then in force is preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. The right of appeal being a vested right, the said right to enter the superior court exists as on and from the date of the commencement of the action and although the said right may actually be exercised only when the adverse judgment is pronounced, the said right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. This vested right of appeal can be taken away only a subsequent enactment provided it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. (See the decisio