The main legal point established in the judgment is that a subordinate authority cannot challenge the decision of a superior authority in areas of quasi-judicial functions, and that the doctrine of merger and bias must be considered in such cases.

Petitioners - District Executive Officers, functioning under the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985, called the Act hereinafter, challenge orders of the appellate authority modifying orders passed by them.

2. S.3 of the Act provides for constitution of a welfare fund and S.6 for constitution of a Board to administer the fund. S.7 provides for appointment of officers to determine contributions payable by employers. Petitioners were so appointed. The Government or other authority specified by the Government, is empowered to hear appeals against orders made by such officers. Appellate orders made by Government are challenged by petitioners, who claim to be aggrieved by those orders. To show that they have locus standi, petitioners rely on S.35C(2) of the Central Excise & Salt Act which enables a Collector, to authorise his subordinate officers, to file appeals against orders of 'Appellate' Collectors. In that department, there are 'Collectors' and 'Appellate Collectors' and the latter perform only quasi-judicial functions.

3. Counsel for respondents submit that petitioners are not aggrieved persons, that permitting them to challenge orders of the appellate authority would militate against well established tenets in areas of quasi judicial functioning, and that the doctrine of merger and bias must halt them in their track to reach remedies. To support the first contention, Shri.M.B. Kurup appearing for some of the respondents, relied on a decision of this court in Divisional Forest Officer v. Pushpan (1983 KLT 951). A learned judge of this court held that a Divisional Forest Officer after issuing an order, became functus officio, and that he has no locus standi after his order merged with the order of the superior authority. This contention was endorsed by Shri.B. Radhakrishnan, who appeared as Amicus Curiae. He pointed out that the petitions are not filed by the Board, or on behalf of them, and that in the light of S.6(2) of the Act, the Fund is a body corporate which "shall by the said name sue and be sued". According to him, petitioners are not aggrieved persons because, even in a pecuniary sense the contributions go to a pool, and not to the petitioners. The doctrine of merger also stands against petitioners, submits Sri. Radhakrishnan. The contention that petitioners have no locus standi commends acceptance, as they cannot act for the fund and as they have no enforceable interest.

4. Relying on the decision in M/s. Gojer Brothers (P) Ltd. v. Sri. Ratan Lai Singh (AIR 1974 SC 1380), Sri. Radhakrishnan submitted that there can only be one operative order governing the same subject, and that the order of an inferior tribunal loses identity by merger with the order of the superior tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the principle of merger extends not only to judicial proceedings, but also to proceedings of quasi judicial and executive orders. Both on principle and precedent, this contention must be sustained.

5. He also relied on the decision in Sayed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan (AIR 1964 SC 477) to contend that a tribunal cannot place itself in the position of an interested party and challenge an order. If a tribunal acts as a party with an interest in the subject matter, the quality of its determination cannot commend approval. That will be a case of the party being judge of his cause. Answering this contention, counsel for petitioners submitted that petitioners did not judge their cause because, they filed the writ petitions after the cause was determined. That would make no difference. It is not the point of time when bias exerts which matters, but the combination of two inconsistent characteristics, in one authority. A personal interest and a quasi judicial power cannot inhere in the same source.

6. Bias is a feature that stamps the decision making process, with vice on its forehead. This rule is based on principles of natural justice. The right to be heard, postulates the right to be heard by an imp