Judges : PADMANABHAN
Samuel Joseph - Appellant
Versus
Ramachandran Chellayyan - Respondent
Case No : S.A. NO.3 of 1984
Decided On : 11/23/1990
Advocates Appeared :
Pirappancode V. Sreedharan Nair S.P. Aravindakashan Filial For Appellant S. Subramani, P. Sukumaran Nayar & V.N. Achutha Kurup For Respondents
Limitation Act - Appeal - S.5, S.14 - Summary
Fact of the Case:
The appellant filed an appeal before the High Court instead of the District Court due to a bona fide mistake, resulting in the appeal being returned and re-presented after the limitation period. The District Judge dismissed the appeal due to delay in re-presentation.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found that the District Judge's reasoning was confused and incorrectly applied S.5 and S.14 of the Limitation Act. It held that the delay was due to a bona fide mistake and practical difficulties, and thus allowed the appeal.
Issues: The issues involved the correct application of S.5 and S.14 of the Limitation Act, the bona fide nature of the delay, and the practical difficulties faced by the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court emphasized that S.5 and S.14 operate in different areas and can be applied separately. It also highlighted the need for a liberal construction of 'sufficient cause' under S.5 to advance substantial justice.
Final Decision: The second appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned, and the appeal was remanded to the District Judge for consideration on its merits.
Preliminary decree for partition passed by the Subordinate Judge, Thiruvananthapuram in O.S.No. 66 of 1972 on 30-10-1976 could have been appealed before the District Judge, Thiruvananthapuram. But, by a bona fide mistake, A.S.No.171 of 1977 was filed before this court on the last day of limitation. Period of limitation for appeal to the High Court is 90 days, but to the District Court, it is only 30 days. Instead of filing the appeal before the High Court, if it was filed before the District Court, it would have been beyond time. This court admitted the appeal, but, later on finding that it had to be filed before the District Court, returned the same for presentation before that court. The order was on 2-4-1980 and the memorandum of appeal was returned on 5-4-1980. A fresh memorandum of appeal was presented before the District Judge only on 18-4-1980 with an application to condone the delay and exclusion of the period under Ss.5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. The District Judge dismissed the application under Ss.5 and 14 and the appeal was also consequently dismissed. Hence this second appeal by the appellant, who is the 40th defendant.
2. The District Judge was of the view that if the appeal was re-presented on 5-4-1980 itself, the period between 5-7-1977 and 5-4-1980, when the appeal was pending before the High Court could have been excluded under S.14 of the Limitation Act, but, since it was filed only on 18-4-1980, there is no scope for invoking either S.5 or S.14 of the Limitation Act. In this case, there are four plaintiffs and about 100 defendants. The delay was explained as the bona fide mistake regarding the forum and the time taken for preparing a fresh memorandum of appeal and getting the copies printed. The District Judge said that, in view of the fact that the appeal was presented before the High Court only on the last day of limitation, the appellant was obliged to re-present the same on the day it was returned. In support of the conclusion, the decisions in Parameswara Kurup v. Vasudeva Kurup (1964 KLT145) and Abraham v. Sadanandan and others (1979 KLT 493) were relied on.
3. Both decisions concern original suits filed in wrong courts not having jurisdiction. They were returned for presentation before competent courts granting time for that purpose. The suits were re-presented within those periods, but they were out of time, according to the law of limitation. In Abraham's case (1979 KLT 493), the benefit of S.4 of the Limitation Act was necessary because the period of limitation expired on a holiday. The court said that the benefit of S.4 is not available when the suit was filed in the wrong court and S.4 cannot be read together with S.14 because they provide for different situations, one for computation of limitation and the other for exclusion of time. So also, the decision said that any period of grace granted by the court to credit court fee will not be a period of limitation because the time granted is not based on any statutory provision and it cannot come under the exclusion in S.14, which is available only for the actual period when the suit was pending in the court and not for the period for which time was given after return of plaint. In Parameswara Kurup's case (1964 KLT 145), the decision said that the Munsiff, before whom the suit was wrongly filed, had no jurisdiction to extend time and, if he had jurisdiction, the suit could have been treated as re-presented within time. It was in that connection, the decision said, following some earlier decisions, that where a suit had been instituted in a court, which did not have jurisdiction, and it was found necessary to raise a second suit in a court of competent jurisdiction, the second suit cannot be regarded as a continuation of the first, even though the subject matter and parties were identical.
4. Learned District Judge seems to have a confused thinking in the matter. So far as a suit is concerned,S.5 of the Limitation Act has no application.
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