The court clarified the scope of the Supreme Court's observations and the application of the Probation of Offenders Act, emphasizing that the Act's provisions should be applied judiciously based on the specific circumstances of each case.

1. Mother and son (accused 1 and 2) were tried for offences punishable under S.307, 332, 212 and 225 read with S.34 of the Indian Penal Code, but convicted only under S.212,324 and 332. Sentences were also imposed. Appeals by State and the accused were disposed of by a common judgment on 28-3-1988. Both appeals were partly allowed. Convictions and sentences were modified. First accused was ordered to be released on probation. Second accused was convicted under S.212, 225 and 332 and reduced sentence of simple imprisonment for one year (maximum sentence awarded by the trial court was three years) was awarded under each count with direction to suffer the sentences concurrently. In Special Leave Petition No. 1739 of 1988, filed by the second accused, the Honourable Supreme Court ordered:

"Special Leave Petition is dismissed. The petitioner may, if he is so advised, approach the High Court for an application under the Probation of Offenders Act".

Accordingly, this petition was filed under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying that in the light of the opportunity given by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, this Court may be pleased to invoke the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act to release him on probation. Both sides and Advocate Shri. T.R. Raman Pillai as amicus curiae were heard.

2. Petitioner holds the view that even though the special leave petition was dismissed and it amounts to refusal to interfere with the conviction as well as sentence, the subsequent portion of the order will have to be interpreted as a direction to entertain and dispose of on the merits a petition to apply the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. If it is so interpreted, this Court may not be justified in refusing to entertain and consider the prayer on the merits on the ground that there is the bar under S.362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure saying that the sentence awarded remain intact.

3. Unlike in England, the obiter dicta of the Privy Council (till the Supreme Court takes a different view) and of the Supreme Court, as distinguished from casual observations not binding on any court, are binding on all the courts in India. Casual observations on matters never required to be decided could not have been or treated as decided f Mohandas Issardas v. A.N. Sattanathan -1954 (56) Bombay Law Reporter 1156 accepted in Ranchhoddas Atmaram v. The Union of India-1961 (3) Supreme Court Reports 718). A decision is only authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from various observations made in it (1968 A.S.C. 647 and (1901) A.C. 495, 506). An obita dictum is an expression of opinion on a point which is not necessary for the decision of a case. The question, which is necessary for the determination of the case, would be the ratio decidendi.

4. That apart, the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court under Art.136 of the Constitution is very wide. It is not possible to define with precision the limitations on the exercise of that jurisdiction (Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax-A.I.R. 1955 Supreme Court 65). Though the power has to be exercised only sparingly in exceptional cases of extra ordinary situations, there cannot be any technical hurdle of any kind. Finality of findings of facts or other grounds cannot stand in the way. The whole intent and purpose of Art.136 is that it is the duty of the Supreme Court to see that injustice is not perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of courts and tribunals because certain laws have made the decisions of these courts or tribunals final and conclusive. The High Court cannot ignore what the Supreme Court said on the ground that the relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Court. So also, the High Court cannot sit in judgment over what the Supreme Court said (Ballabadas Mathuradas Lakhani and others v. Municipal Com