The legal principle established is that the obligation of providing maintenance and support continues even after the dissolution of marriage, and the welfare of the children is of paramount importance in cases of divorce or judicial separation.

1. Appellant who is the wife of the respondent challenges the order of the District Judge, Kozhikode in O.P. 212 of 1981, which is a petition under S.13(1) (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The learned District judge allowed the petition and declared the marriage between them dissolved.

2. For the purpose of convenience the husband is referred to as the petitioner and wife as the respondent.

3. The petitioner married the respondent on 14-12-1972 in accordance with the custom prevalent in the Thiyya community. The allegation of the petitioner is that the relationship between him and the respondent was cordial during the initial days of the marriage, that his wife behaved arrogantly towards him, that while becoming pregnant of the third child she left his house on her own accord in August 1976, that she adopted stubborn attitude and never returned to his house and that all his entreaties to her to return to his house proved futile in view of her adament attitude of hostility. -The trial Court considering the evidence held that the allegation of desertion has been succinctly established and granted dissolution of the marriage.

4. S.13(1) (ib) and S.10(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act envisage desertion as a ground for divorce and judicial separation. The term desertion is defined in the explanation to S.13(1) of the Act. The explanation reads:

"In this sub-section, the expression "desertion" means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly."

To constitute an act of desertion two elements must be there on the side of the deserting spouse. Firstly, the factum of physical separation is the sine qua non of desertion. There must also be the animus deserandi to bring co-habitation or the matrimonial consortium to an end. Likewise, so far as deserted spouse is concerned, to constitute desertion, it must be affirmatively established that he was not a consenting party to the desertion by the opposite party. In other words, if it is found that desertion happened on account of the action of the deserted spouse he cannot legitimately adopt the posture of innocence. On the side of the deserted spouse there should not occur any conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving matrimonial house. In a case where desertion is alleged to obtain decree of divorce it must be established that the deserting spouse purposefully kept away from the other party to the marriage with the avowed intention of not having any matrimonial relationship. In Rohini Kumari v. Narendra Singh (AIR. 1972 S.C. 459) the Supreme Court held that desertion within the meaning of S.10(1) (e) of the Act read with Explanation does not imply only a separate residence and separate living but also a determination to put an end to matrimonial relationship and co-habitation. One of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation is the quality of permanence. If in a case a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion or anger without intending to cease co-habitation permanently, it will not amount to desertion. In a case where a spouse had left the opposite party's company never to return and with the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end, the necessary animus deserandi can be inferred. In a case where physical separation with animus deserandi has been established, certainly, the allegation of desertion stands proved.

5. The evidence in the case would show that P.W.1 made several attempts to bring back his wife to his house. Respondent contended that she was always willing to reside with her husband. There, is no evidence of she sending any letter to the petitioner or making any attempt to contact him. She admitted that nothing prevented he