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1989 Supreme(Ker) 88

Judges : BALAKRISHNA MENON,KRISHNAMOORTHY
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO.LTD. - Appellant
Versus
RAJU MARKOSE - Respondent
Case No : M.F.A. No. 410 of 1987
Decided On : 02/27/1989
Advocates Appeared :
P.V.R. Kaimal; For Appellant P.N. Ramakrishnan Nair; For Respondent

The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement to prove negligence for claiming compensation in motor accident cases, and the limited relief granted under S.92A of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Headnote:

Insurance - Motor Accident Claims - S.92A of the Motor Vehicles Act - [MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS] - [S.92A] - The court discussed the applicability of S.92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, which dispenses with the need to prove negligence in the matter of awarding compensation for motor accidents. The court highlighted the limited relief granted to the legal representatives of victims who have died in motor vehicle accidents under S.92A, and emphasized that the substantive law continues to be in force without proof of negligence except to the extent dispensed with by S.92A.

Fact of the Case:

The case involved a car accident resulting in the death of a mother, with the claim for compensation filed by her children against the driver of the car and the insurer. The Tribunal awarded compensation, holding the driver responsible for negligence. The insurer appealed against the award.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the driver and that no case had been made out for the award of compensation.

Issues: The issues revolved around the liability for compensation in a motor accident claim, the applicability of S.92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, and the defenses available to the insurer.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the need to prove negligence for claiming compensation in motor accident cases, highlighted the limited relief granted under S.92A of the Act, and discussed the defenses available to the insurer under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the award of the Tribunal against the insurer, and held that the parties will suffer their respective costs.

Judgment :-

1. The 2nd respondent insurer appeals against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Quilon in O.P. (M. V.) 206 of 1985 directing the insurer to pay compensation Rs. 2,10,000/- to the petitioners for the death of their mother Grace Markose in a car accident on 7-12-1978.

2. The claim was for compensation Rs.6,00,000/- from respondents 1 and 2. The 1st respondent is none other than the father of the claimants. The claimants are minors represented by their next friend.

3. The car KLI 1050 belonged to the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent himself was driving the car bringing his children home from their boarding school at Trivandrum. Their mother Grace Markose was in the front seat. The accident took place at 5.30 p. m. at road junction on the M. C. Road, south of Kottarakkara town. The vehicle capsized causing serious injuries to Grace Markose. She succumbed to the injuries on the same day at about 9 p. m. The petitioners are the children of Grace Markose and the 1st respondent. They claim compensation for the death of their mother who was a medical officer in the St. John's Hospital, Kattappana drawing a salary of Rs. 2500/-p. m. The case was posted from time to time and on 6-3-1981 it was posted to 4-4-1981 allowing the respondents a last chance to file written statements. The 2nd respondent insurer filed a written statement on 4-4-1981. No written statement was filed by the 1st respondent. Much later on 8-5-1981 the 1st respondent filed a written statement wherein he has raised a contention that the liability, if any, is of the insurer as the vehicle is covered by a policy of insurance. According to him the cause of death of Grace Markose was an accident and not due to his negligence. The 2nd respondent insurer disclaimed its liability to compensate the petitioners for the death of Grace Markose in the accident. The Tribunal found rashness and negligence on the part of the 1st respondent as, according to the tribunal, the accident itself speaks for the same. The Tribunal awarded a consolidated sum of Rs. 2,10,000/- as compensation. The award is against both respondents 1 and 2. But the 2nd respondent insurer is directed to pay the amount and on failure of payment, there is a further direction that execution steps should be taken first against the 2nd respondent insurer.

4. In the petition itself it is stated "the accident involving the death of the deceased was only accidental". There is no averment of rashmess or negligence on the part of the 1st respondent in driving the vehicle. The 1st respondent in his written statement, though filed at a belated stage, had also raised a contention that the accident was not due to negligence on his part. When examined as R. W.1 the 1st respondent spoke about the incident as a pure accident which could not have been avoided by him while driving the vehicle. P. Ws.1 to 4 examined on behalf of the petitioners also spoke about the incident as a pure accident. There is neither pleading nor proof that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the 1st respondent. A Division Bench of this Court in K.A. Kurup v. P. Sukumaran Nair (1980 K.LT 750) following the decisions of the Supreme Court in Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna (AIR 1977 SC 1248) and Bishan Devi v. Sirbaksh Singh (AIR 1979 SC 1862) stated at page 751:

" A liability can be cast on another only if he is in any way responsible for the accident which occasioned the injury. In other words there is no scope for any absolute liability on owner the of the vehicle to compensate the injured. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act do not contain any statutory provision to that effect. The Act does not provide a new right or a new remedy, to a person who is injured by an accident. The provisions of the Act do not in any way interfere with the substantive common law on the subject. It follows the petitioner has to prove that opposite party used the vehicle in such a negligent way and occasioned the injury for which comp








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