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1989 Supreme(Ker) 273
Judges : PADMANABHAN
Narayana Pillai - Appellant
Versus
Kunju Amma - Respondent
Case No : S. A. No. 355 of 1984
Decided On : 07/27/1989
Advocates Appeared :
O.V. Radhakrishnan; K. Radhamani Amma; For Appellant P.G. P. Panicker; For Respondent
The court emphasized the discretionary nature of specific performance, the requirement of mutuality in agreements, and the impact of subsequent events and time lapse on the enforceability of the claim.
Headnote:
specific performance - unilateral agreement - Transfer of Property Act - Specific Relief Act
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff appealed against the appellate decree dismissing his suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale. The defendant unilaterally executed an agreement for sale in favor of the plaintiff, but later repudiated it and sold the property to another party. The plaintiff claimed readiness and willingness to perform, but did not deposit the sale consideration in court.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the unilateral agreement lacked mutuality and enforceability. It exercised discretion not to grant specific performance due to the unfair advantage it would give the plaintiff over the defendant. The court also held that the subsequent sale to another party and the time lapse further precluded the grant of relief.
Issues: The issues involved the enforceability of the unilateral agreement, the readiness and willingness of the parties, and the impact of subsequent events on the claim for specific performance.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was influenced by the lack of mutuality in the agreement, the defendant's repudiation and subsequent sale, and the discretionary nature of specific performance. The court also considered the impact of time lapse and changed circumstances on the claim for relief.
Final Decision: The Second Appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.
1. Plaintiff appeals against the appellate decree dismissing his suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale in reversal of the decree of the trial court.
2. Ext.A1 is the agreement unilaterally executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff, who is her sister's son-in-law, on 6-4-1978. The property is 31/2 cents and a building. Consideration is Rs.5,000/-. Term is three years. Towards the sale consideration, the appellant executed a pronote in favour of the respondent on 6-4-1978 itself for Rs.4,900/- with a term of three years. Balance amount of Rs.100/- was agreed to be paid when the sale deed is executed. That means, in effect, the entire sale consideration of Rs.5,000/- was to be paid when the sale deed is executed.
3. On 27-3-1981, appellant issued notice demanding sale and requesting defendant to appear before the Sub Registrar on 6-4-1981. On 3-4-1981, respondent sent Ext. A4 reply repudiating Ext. A1 and stating that even though she signed Ext. A1 it was without knowing the contents and the agreement was for executing sale deed for a consideration of Rs.10,000/- within one year. She expressed her disinclination and did not appear.
4. The suit was filed on 4-6-1981 alleging that the appellant was and is ready and willing whereas the respondent was not. Respondent also took the stand that she was also ready and willing to execute the sale deed on the terms actually agreed upon and since the appellant did not come forward, she sold the property on 4-6-1981 to one Divakaran Nair for Rs.10,000/-. 4-6-1981 is the date on which the suit was filed. She also mentioned about the fact that her claim under the pronote, which is part of the sale consideration, has become barred and, therefore, time stipulated has to be taken as the essence of the contract. In the replication, appellant took the stand that if the pronote has become barred by limitation, respondent has to reap the consequences.
5. Jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so, even though the discretion is not arbitrary but should be sound and judicial, guided by judicial principles. When the term of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant, the court can exercise the discretion not to grant specific performance even if it is lawful.
6. Ext.A1 is a unilateral document in which there in no mutuality. It was executed by the defendant alone. It cannot be termed as a contract. There was nothing which the defendant could have enforced in case of breach by the plaintiff except the pronote which was liable to become time-barred and actually became so on the expiry of the term fixed in Ext.Al. Even though Ext.A1 contained a provision that in case of breach by the plaintiff he is liable to pay Rs. 1,000/- the defendant cannot enforce it because Ext.A1 was by the defendant alone. Parties were not thus placed on equal position. Further the recitals in Ext.A1 show that the amount under the pronote is payable only within 3 years at the option of the plaintiff. That means, if the plaintiff does not pay the amount on or before 6-4-1981, there is no remedy for the defendant under the pronote. The stand taken by the plaintiff in the replication is that if the pronote gets barred and thus becomes unenforceable, defendant alone is responsible for it. From that contention, it is evident that he is not accepting the provision in Ext. A1 that the pronote amount is payable only at his option within three years. Eventhough he said that he was and is ready and willing, he did not deposit the sale consideration in court. His stand appears to be that he is bound to pay only Rs.100/- because the liability under the pronote is something to be enforced by the defendant. In thes
