The main legal point established in the judgment is that provisions in a sale deed restricting the enjoyment of property transferred absolutely are void under the Transfer of Property Act. Additionally, the court emphasized that equitable relief, such as injunction, is an extraordinary discretionary relief and requires the party seeking it to come with clean hands and do equity.

1. Plaintiff in O.S.No.13 of 1978 is the appellant. Her suit for declaration of the right to use the pipe line, motor and pump set for drawing water from the plaint Schedule.56 cents to irrigate her land was dismissed by both the courts below. O.S.No.13 of 1978 was tried jointly with O.S.No.15 of 1978 filed by the first defendant for injunction restraining plaintiff and others from obstructing the flow of water through the pipe connecting the tank in B schedule property and the tank well in A schedule property. That suit was decreed. But the decision was reversed in appeal and that suit was also dismissed. The decision was not appealed against.

2. Plaintiff and first defendant are sisters. They are owners of adjacent lands, which originally formed a compact plot owned by their father Krishnan. He installed a motor and pump set in the tank-well in the land which now belongs to first defendant. The entire land was irrigated through pipes from the tank-well. Supply of water to the tank-well was through underground pipes from a tank in the plaintiff's property. O.S.No.15 of 1978 was filed because plaintiff obstructed flow of water to the tank-well.

3. Now the short question for consideration is whether the appellant, especially after she successfully contested O.S.No.15 of 1978, is entitled to the declaration and injunction. Appellant got the property by Ext.Bl sale deed of 1961 from her father. First defendant also got her land by a sale deed from the father. That was in 1975. It is Ext. Al. Both the sale deeds were transferring absolute rights and possession though the defendants have a case that in spite of the sale deeds, the father was in possession till his death. But there is no case that title did not pass under Exts.B1 or Al. In Ext.Bl, there is no condition at all restricting the right transferred to any extent. In Ext. A1 of 1975 also, there is no restriction in the body. But, while describing the schedule of properties, it is said that his second wife and other daughters will have the right to take water from the tank-well through the pipe lines for irrigating their lands subject to certain conditions. The claim of the appellant is based on this provision.

4. The motor, pump set and pipe lines are now more or less in disuse because flow of water to the tank-well in the first defendant's property from which water has to be taken through the pipe lines for irrigation of the other lands also is effectively blocked by the appellant and the parties have other irrigation facilities. Further by the dismissal of O.S.No.15 of 1978 on the contest of the appellant the right to take water to the tank-well is also lost for ever to the first defendant. For that reason alone, the claim of the appellant will have to be rejected even if it is taken for granted that originally there was the right under Ext.A1.

5. The trial court dismissed O.S.No.13 of 1978 on the ground that the reservation in the schedule in Ext.A1 will not confer any right because it is only a pious wish. The appellate court said that the impugned provision in Ext.A1 is hit by the first part of S.ll of the Transferor Property Act and the second part is not applicable. Before this court, there were two more claims, one under S.40 of the Transfer of Property Act and the other as a quasi-easement under S.13of the Easements Act. So also, a claim in equity was put forward. I do not think that any of these claims could stand.

6. There is no question of the first part, or second part of S.ll of the Transfer of Property Act being applied in this case. By Ext.Bl, absolute right was transferred to . the appellant in 1961. Thereafter, the father had no right over that portion. Ext.Bl does not contain any direction or restriction which is void under the first part of S.ll. The direction or restriction is contained only in Ext.A1 of 1975. At that time, the father had no right over appellant's property since he parted with his rights 14 years earlier. By Ext.A1 also, absolut