The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Land Tribunal has the power to restore an application dismissed for default under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, as it is necessary for the effective implementation of the provisions of the Act.

1. One of us referred these two cases for the decision of a Division Bench. One of the questions that requires consideration for a proper decision of these two Civil Revision Petitions is the question whether the Land Tribunal, under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, has got the power to restore an application dismissed for default.

2. Gopalan Nambiyar, J., as he then was, had occasion to consider this matter in Kuttappan v. Thresia (1973 KLT. 521), where His Lordship observed thus:

"S.101 confers on the Tribunal certain specifically enumerated powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of certain specified matters. But the power under 0.9, R.9, of setting aside an ex parte decree or order is not one of the specifically conferred or enumerated powers. S.101(1) (e) provides that the Land Tribunal may have the powers of a civil court under the Civil Procedure Code in respect of any other matter which may be "prescribed"; but no such prescription was brought to my notice. In the face of these, the Land Tribunal, being essentially a statutory Tribunal with specifically enumerated powers, cannot have the power to set aside an ex parte decree or order."

3. His Lordship further held that the former part of 0.9, R.9, providing for the bar of a fresh suit on the same cause of action would not be attracted as far as the Land Tribunal is concerned. The court referred to the Full Bench decision of this court in Kalyani Amma Bhargavi Amma v. Ouseph Varkey (1967 KLT. 317) and said that the Full Bench has held with respect to the provisions of Ss.101, 129(2)(e) of the Land Reforms Act and R.99 of the Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, that the Land Tribunal had power to set aside an ex parte order. It was further held that the requisite power was found under the provisions of R.99 and the Full Bench overruled the contrary view taken in three single bench decisions. The thrust of the decisions in 1973 KLT. 521 can be seen from the following passage:

"As the conclusion was rested solely on R.99 of the Rules, and as there is now no such or similar rule, I am unable to hold that there is a power in the Land Tribunal to set aside an ex parte decree."

It is pertinent to note that Nambiyar, J., as he then was, referring to the decision in C.R.P.No.270 of 1969 said that the Full Bench decision was considered and the court held that the former part of 0.9, R.9, providing for the bar of a fresh suit on the same cause of action would not be attracted as far as the Land Tribunal is concerned.

4. The Full Bench in 1967 KLT. 317 considered the question of the power of the Land Tribunal to pass orders ex parte to dismiss for default and to set aside ex parte orders and orders of dismissal. The Full Bench, of course, relied on R.99 of the Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules to hold that the Tribunal has got jurisdiction to pass orders ex parte, to dismiss for default and to set aside exparte orders and orders of dismissal for default. But it is significant to note that certain passages in paragraph six of the Full Bench decision spearhead a salient and signal jurisprudential thinking. It reads thus:

"If we hold that, there is no jurisdiction for the Land Tribunal to restore, logically it must also be held, that it has no jurisdiction to dismiss for default either, and that such dismissal is void and must be treated as non est."

It is a primary jurisprudential and logical look of the situation.

5. Counsel for the respondents submitted before us that if this court on an interpretation of the statutory provisions, holds that the court has no jurisdiction to restore an application dismissed for default, this Court is bound to hold logically that the Tribunal has no power to dismiss an application for default. Counsel submitted before us that even for a court this power of dismissal for default is conferred by the C.P.C. under specific provisions and with specific enumeration of circumstances under which such power can be exerci