The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for defendants to plead and satisfy the essential conditions under S.53-A of the Transfer of Property Act to attract its protection.

1. Appellants are defendants 1 and 2 in O.S. 88 of 1978 of the Sub Court, Thodupuzha. Plaintiffs (respondent's suit for rendition of accounts and injunction was decreed by the trial court.

2. On 3-3-1980 defendants did not appear before the court when the suit was listed for trial. Though they sought adjournment of the case with a medical certificate the Court did not grant it. The first defendant's counsel submitted no instructions. On the basis of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff the suit was decreed. I.A. 225 of 1980 was filed under 0.9 R.13 C.P.C. to set aside the exparte order. That petition was rejected on 27-3-1980 by the Court below holding that the disposal of the case was on merits and so the petition under 0.9 R.13 is not maintainable. The appeal is filed against the judgment and decree of the trial Court.

3. Learned counsel for the defendants (appellants) submitted that an opportunity may be afforded to the defendants to substantiate their contentions by remanding the cases to the trial Court. Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that no purpose will be served by remanding the case to the trial Court in view of the lack of pleadings in the case.

4. Plaintiff filed the suit for rendition of accounts and permanent injunction. The property admittedly belongs to the plaintiff. As the plaintiff was residing away from the property she entrusted it to the first defendant for management and executed Ext. A-1 power of attorney. He belongs to her deceased husband's family. He has another property near the suit property. It is the case of the plaintiff that the first defendant did not care to render accounts to her and that he misappropriated the amounts due to her. It is also stated in the plaint that the first defendant had obtained signed stamped blank papers from the plaintiff representing that they were necessary for some lawful purposes. On knowing about the mis¬deeds of the first defendant the plaintiff had cancelled the power of attorney on 29-4-1978 which was acknowledged by the first defendant. Exst. A-2 is the copy of the registered notice. According to the plaintiff, the defendants have no manner of right over the property and that the first defendant is liable to render accounts to her. Plaintiff sought injunction against the defendants restraining them from obstructing her peaceful enjoyment of the property.

5. First defendant filed written statement admitting the power of attorney in his favour by the plaintiff. But he contended that the plaintiff had executed an agreement for sale in his favour on 27-12-1969 with respect to the plaint schedule property and another property belonging to her minor daughter. It is also contended that another agreement for sale was executed on 30-1-1974 in confirmation of the earlier agreement in her individual capacity and also as the guardian of her minor daughter. First defendant contended that he had paid the entire consideration and therefore he is entitled to protection, under S.53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. First defendant also contended that the property is now in the possession of the second defendant and that the plaintiff had relinquished all her claim with regard to the above property.

6. Second defendant filed written statement reiterating the contentions of the first defendant. He further stated that he got possession of the property from the first defendant with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff is not entitled to any reliefs in the suit.

7. A remand of the case to the trial Court is necessary only if it would be legally possible for the defendants to substantiate their contentions. Otherwise a remand would be a sheer exercise in futility.

8. The question to be considered is whether on the pleadings it would be available to the defendants to take a defence under S.53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. S.53-A has been described by the Privy Council in Pir Bux v. Mohammed Tahar (AIR 1934 P.C.235) as a partial im