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Judges : PADMANABHAN
Mathu - Appellant
Versus
Cherchi - Respondent
Case No : S.A. No. 432 of 1988
Decided On : 12/11/1989
Advocates Appeared :
T.S. Venkiteswara Iyer; P.K. Balasubramoniyam; S.V. Balakrishna Iyer; For Appellant N. Viswanatha Iyer; For Respondent
sale deed - Mother sued to cancel Ext.A2 sale deed for Rs. 10,000/- in favour of the son - S.16 of the Contract Act, S.111 of the Evidence Act - The court discussed the voluntary execution of the document, presumption under S.114 Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act, and the burden of proving vitiating factors under S.111 of the Evidence Act and S.16(3) of the Indian Contract Act.
Fact of the Case:
Mother sued to cancel Ext.A2 sale deed for Rs. 10,000/- in favour of the son, claiming she was made to execute the document believing it to be a chitty hypothecation bond. The suit was decreed and confirmed in appeal. Second appeal is by the defendant son.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the execution of the document was voluntary, and the burden of proving vitiating factors under S.111 of the Evidence Act and S.16(3) of the Indian Contract Act was on the person who supports the document.
Issues: The issues included the voluntary execution of the document, presumption under S.114 Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act, and the burden of proving vitiating factors under S.111 of the Evidence Act and S.16(3) of the Indian Contract Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the burden of proving vitiating factors under S.111 of the Evidence Act and S.16(3) of the Indian Contract Act is on the person who supports the document, and discussed the presumption of active confidence or dominating position enabling undue influence.
Final Decision: Second Appeal is allowed. Decrees and judgments are set aside. Suit is dismissed. No costs. Allowed.
Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:
The case involves a mother who filed a suit to cancel a sale deed in favor of her son, claiming that she was made to execute the document under the mistaken belief that it was a chitty hypothecation bond for a certain amount. The sale deed was for Rs. 10,000 and related to land and a building (!) .
The court found that the execution of the sale deed was voluntary, supported by evidence indicating proper registration procedures and the respondent's knowledge of the document's contents. The presumption of proper execution was upheld, and the burden of proving any vitiating factors was on the person supporting the document (!) [15000075850002].
The respondent, despite claiming illiteracy, was found to have sufficient experience and familiarity with legal documents, which undermined her claim of ignorance about the nature of the sale deed. Evidence from witnesses and the registration process supported the conclusion that the document was executed voluntarily (!) [15000075850002].
The court emphasized that the mere fact of the relationship, inadequacy of consideration, or payment of taxes does not automatically invalidate a deed. The circumstances suggested that the transaction was a sale, not a hypothecation or security agreement, especially given the conduct and evidence regarding possession and receipt of consideration (!) [15000075850004].
The respondent's claim that she was unaware of the true nature of the document was not credible, especially given her admission of receipt of money and her familiarity with the execution process. The evidence indicated that her assertion of executing a hypothecation bond was an artificial story, and the actual intent was a sale (!) [15000075850005].
The plea of mistake of fact (non-est factum) was rejected because the circumstances did not satisfy the legal requirements for such a defense. The respondent was a person of full capacity, and no fraudulent misrepresentation or incapacity was established (!) [15000075850006].
The legal principles regarding the burden of proof were discussed, emphasizing that the initial presumption favors the validity of a deed. The burden shifts to the person supporting the document to prove vitiating factors when there is an allegation of active confidence, undue influence, or unconscionable conduct. Such allegations must be specifically pleaded and proved with evidence (!) [15000075850007][15000075850008].
Special considerations apply when dealing with vulnerable persons such as illiterate, old, or infirm individuals. In such cases, the burden remains on the supporter of the document to establish that the deed was executed freely, with full understanding, and not under duress or undue influence. In this case, these conditions were not satisfied (!) [15000075850009].
The courts below had erroneously based their decisions on misunderstandings of the legal and factual positions. The second appeal was allowed, the previous decrees and judgments were set aside, and the suit was dismissed with no costs (!) (!) .
In summary, the court held that the execution of the sale deed was voluntary, supported by proper registration and credible evidence, and that the respondent failed to establish any vitiating factors such as undue influence, mistake, or fraud. The legal principles regarding the burden of proof and the presumption of proper execution were applied to dismiss the mother's claim to rescind the sale.
1. Mother sued to cancel Ext.A2 sale deed for Rs. 10,000/- in favour of the son relating to 68 cents and a building on the sole ground that she executed the document to benefit the son believing his word that it is only a chitty hypothecation bond for Rs. 10,000/-. The only evidence is her testimony as PW1 that she was made to execute the document saying that he wants money for his trade purposes. The suit was decreed and the decision was confirmed in appeal. Second appeal is by the defendant son.
2. Rejecting the contention that what is involved is a bona fide sale, the courts below decreed the suit on the grounds of relationship as mother and son, inadequacy of consideration, payment of tax by the mother after sale and possession of the original sale deed by her. Even after giving the most liberal interpretation what would come out from the plaint and evidence of PW1 is only a mistake of fact or a fraudulent misrepresentation. S.16 of the Contract Act or S.111 of the Evidence Act were not relied on by the respondent or the courts below, but the decisions seen to be presumably under those sections.
3. Voluntary execution of the document thinking that it is a chitty hypothecation bond for Rs.10,000/- is admitted. It is also admitted that the document was executed to benefit the appellant and she told the Sub Registrar, at the time of registration, that she received Rs. 10,000/-. Such a statement she could have made to the Sub Registrar only when asked by him. If so, it is clear that the Sub Registrar must have properly discharged his official duty eliciting voluntary execution and receipt of consideration. Though respondent claims to be illiterate, it is proved otherwise. She has experience in execution of documents and conduct of cases also. DW.2 and 3 are the scribe and attestor to Ext.A2. Their evidence show that contents of Ext.A2 were known to the respondent before execution and registration. The mere fact that DW2 was declared hostile on some other answer given by him does not make the above version unacceptable. Along with these aspects, there is also the presumption under S.114 Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act arising out of the registration of the document.
4. Registration of a document is a solemn act to be performed in the presence of the Registrar, whose duty is to attend to the parties during registration and see that proper persons competent to act are present, and they are identified to his satisfaction; and all things done before him in his official capacity and verified by his signature, will, unless it is shown that some deliberate fraud was successfully committed on him, be presumed to be done duly and in order (Gangamoyi Debi v. Troiluckhya Nath Chowdhry - I.L.R. 33 Calcutta 537 P.C.). Though Ext.A2 is a document required to be attested, examination of attesting witness in proof of execution is necessary under S.68 of the Evidence Act only when execution is denied. In this case, execution is admitted. If so, under S.67 of the Evidence Act, proof can be by any evidence. The evidence furnished by the registration certificate under S.63 of the Registration Act coupled with the presumption under Illustration (e) to S.114 of the Evidence Act supported by the admission of the respondent and the depositions of DW.2 and 3 will be more than sufficient (Sumathi Amma v. Kunjulekshmi Amma -1964 K.L.T. 945 and Kunhamina Umma v. Special Tahsildar and others - I.L.R. 1976(2) Kerala 678).
5. Inadequacy of consideration, payment of tax and possession of Ext.A2 are not grounds pleaded. Simply because the appellant said that consideration represents the market value but the market value is seen to be higher, the document cannot go on that ground. DW 1 is the wife of the appellant. They were residing with the respondent along with their children. Appellant is the eldest son of the respondent. He was managing the family affairs. Sisters were given away in marriage by him. Dispute is only whether he met the expenses
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