The main legal point established in the judgment is the impact of adverse possession on the right to recovery and the starting point of limitation for recovery on the strength of title.

1. A suit for recovery of a building with the land appurtenant thereto on the strength of title was decreed by the trial court but the decision was reversed in appeal and the suit was dismissed. Second Appeal is by the plaintiff.

2. Sathyarthi, uncle of the appellant, was the owner. Along with his wife Judith he bequeathed the property to the appellant and his mother under Ext. Al. After the death of Sathyarthi, claiming to be the full owner as heir of her husband, Judith sold the property to the first defendant under Ext.B2 oh 19-1-1964. She died in December 1965 or January 1966. Appellant was entitled to possession only from that date on the strength of his title under Ext. Al because Judith had the right to enjoy till her death.

3. Claiming under Ext.Al and alleging first defendant to be a lessee under Judith, the appellant sued her in O.S.451 of 1967 not for possession but for rent alone. Title and lease were denied and first defendant claimed full right and possession under Ext.B2. Thereafter also the suit was converted into one for declaration of title and realisation of compensation for use and occupation alone and not for recovery. Thereafter the suit was dismissed by the trial court and appellate court accepting the title of Judith and the first defendant. But the decision was reversed by this Court in 1979 in Second Appeal and the suit decreed.

4. Under a joint and mutual Will, which Ext.Al was, there is an implied understanding that after the death of one or more of the testators the other or others will not be entitled to revoke the Will and they are bound by it. Such a revocation will be unauthorised and it will amount to a breach of trust towards the deceased testator or testators. The Will then became irrevocable and the remaining testators alone by themselves could not revoke or change it. The surviving testators will then assume the role of trustees on behalf of the legatees and they will not be entitled to change the Will of the deceased persons who could not express their desires on account of death. What they said and did will thus become final. In this case over and above that position Judith had the added disadvantage that she had no right for herself in the property except as heir of her husband. That right was not available when the Will of her husband became final by his death. These are the reasons on which the suit was decreed. By the decision what was declared was only title on the basis of the Will and incompetency of Judith to execute Ext.B2.

5. If the starting point of limitation for recovery on the strength of title is the date on which Ext.A3 judgment in second appeal was rendered by this court the suit is well within time. Article of the Limitation Act applicable is 65 and the period is 12 years from the date on which possession becomes adverse. The law as laid down in AIR 1951 T.C. 32 was that by the decree declaring title in favour of the plaintiff, any adverse possession which the defendants had must be deemed to have been interrupted and, as such, a suit based on title within 12 years of the date of such a declaration must be taken to be within time. But the law in that respect underwent a change by the F. B. decision in AIR 1957 T.C. 32 consisting of the two judges who decided AIR 1951 T.C. 32. Now the position is that a decree merely declaring the plaintiffs title to the property involved in the suit will not interrupt the defendant's adverse possession of that property and if such possession is allowed to continue undisturbed for a period of 12 years or more from the commencement of such adverse possession, irrespective of the declaratory decree the defendant will acquire title by prescription. The cause of action for recovery of possession is not from the date of the decree but from the date of defendant's adverse possession.

6. Atleast in January 1966 the right to get possession accrued to the appellant. The suit was filed only on 1-6-1981. Appellant was aware of Ext.B2 and the