The agreement between the parties disentitles the licensee from claiming irrevocability of the license under S.60(b) of the Easement Act.

1. Defendant is the appellant. Plaintiff-respondent filed the suit to evict the defendant from the plaint schedule building alleging that he is only a licensee. Defendant took the stand that Ext.Al evidences a lease and not a licence. Courts below held otherwise.

2. Defendant contends that even assuming that he is only a licensee the construction of a structure of permanent character in the property makes the licence irrevocable under S.60(b) of the Easement Act (for short, the Act). Both the Courts below relying on the commission report held that the construction is of a permanent character. Recitals in Ext.Al reveal that the defendant had obtained the plot on rent and that he had constructed the building thereon. The learned Sub-Judge held that the protection under S.60(b) of the Act will not be available to the defendant as he is bound by the terms in Ext.Al to remove the structure after the period stipulated in the agreement. As the Courts below have held that the defendant is only a licensee, the only surviving question for determination is as to whether he can invoke S.60(b) and claim irrevocability of the licence.

3. Learned counsel for the defendant submitted that in view of the construction of the structure in the property by the defendant the licence has become irrevocable and the plaintiff by invoking provisions in other statutes like Indian Contract Act cannot ignore S.60(b). Relying on Hanifa Jusab v. Dadu A. Gani (A.I.R. 1964 Gujarat 44) and Jagannath v. Jayantilal (A.I.R. 1980 Gujarat 41) counsel submitted that wherever there is a relationship of licensor and licensee, the licence is irrevocable if it comes under S.60(a) or (b) and an agreement to the contrary has only to be ignored. In other words, it is contended that in a case where a structure of permanent character was constructed by the licensee incurring expenditure the Court cannot with the aid of any other statute obliterate the benefit accrued under S.60(b) of the Act.

4. S.60 enumerates the conditions under which a licence is irrevocable. A licence is irrevocable if it is coupled with transfer of property and if such transfer is in force. In a case where the licensee executes a work of permanent character at his expense then also the licence becomes irrevocable. In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College (ALR.1987 S.C.1242 at 1244) the Supreme Court took note of cases where the grantor of a licence may enter into an agreement with the licensee making the licence irrevocable even though none of the two clauses under S.60 are fulfilled. The Supreme Court held that even if the two clauses of S.60 are fulfilled to render the licence irrevocable yet it may not be so if the parties agreed to the contrary. Thus, in a case where the licensee undertakes to demolish the structure he has built in the property and walk away from the property with his belongings he cannot contend later that the licence is irrevocable under S.60(b) and that his undertaking is virtually valueless to the licensor. As it is open to the parties to enter into any agreement which is not opposed to public policy, it cannot be said that merely because of the work of a permanent nature effected by the licensee the agreement becomes a dead letter. In Ziaul Haque v. Standard V.O. Co. (1951--55-Calcutta W.N. 232) the Calcutta High Court held that where a licence is prima facie irrevocable either because it is coupled with a grant or interest or because the licensee has erected works of a permanent nature, there is nothing to prevent the parties from agreeing expressly or impliedly that the licence nevertheless shall be revocable. On the same reasoning, it was held that there is nothing to prevent the parties from agreeing expressly or by necessary implication that a licence which is prima facie revocable being not within either of the categories of irrevocable licence should nevertheless be irrevocable. The Supreme Court has referred to the above ruling in A.I.R. 1987 S.C.1242