The duty of the Advocate General, the requirement for prima facie evidence, and the territorial scope of the Act were central legal principles established in the judgment.

1. This appeal is by the Advocate General challenging the judgment of the learned single judge rendered in O.P. No. 3568/86. The relevant facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal may briefly be stated as follows: The Advocate General filed the petition invoking S.2 of the Madras Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, VIII of 1949. (hereinafter referred to as the Act), as amended by the State of Kerala by the Kerala Adaptation of Laws Order, 1956. The allegations in the petition are that the respondent Sri. T. A. Rajendran Editor of a paper by the name 'Nawab' residing at Fort Cochin has been habitually and without any reasonable ground instituting vexatious proceedings in civil and criminal courts in the State including the High Court and that therefore an order should be passed directing that no proceeding, civil or criminal, shall be instituted by him in any court without the leave of the District and Sessions Judge. The petition was filed on 26th of May, 1986 and it was posted for preliminary hearing before the learned single judge and it was beard on the 28tb of May 1986 and the order was pronounced dismissing the original petition in limine on 2-6-1986. It is the said decision that is challenged in this appeal.

2. The principal contention of the learned Advocate General is that the learned judge was not justified in dismissing the original petition at the stage of admission. The learned Advocate General pointed out that in the petition reference was made to several cases filed by the respondent in support of the plea that the respondent is habitually resorting to vexatious litigation. The copies of the relevant judgments or orders pertaining to those cases and other records pertaining to the same were not produced alone with the petition. It was submitted that it is only when the respondent joins issue in regard to the substantive averments of the appellant that the necessity of substantiating the averments by producing adequate and satisfactory evidence would arise. All that is required to be examined at the stage of the preliminary hearing is as to whether the petition is maintainable and as to whether a prima facie case has been made out. The submission of the learned Advocate General is that this is not the stage at which the court was required to embark upon an exhaustive enquiry into the merits of the case.

3. A petition under S.2 of the Act is different from other original petitions that are brought before the High Court, for more than one reason. The object of the Act is to protect innocent parties from being subjected to vexatious litigation. In other words, it is an action that is brought to prevent the abuse of the process of the court as a result of which innocent persons are harassed. It is the paramount duty of the court to prevent abuse of the process of the court. When the Advocate General initiates action under S.2 of the Act, he does so for achieving a very laudable objective of the Act and to assist the court in the discharge of its paramount duty of ensuring that the process of the court is not abused. The right to move the court for preventing vexatious litigation is conferred on the Advocate General of the State. The Legislature has entrusted this onerous responsibility on such a high, responsible and independent authority with the object of ensuring that the provisions of the Act themselves are not misused. There is no lis in the ordinary sense of the term between the Advocate General on the one band and the party against whom the petition is filed, for, the Advocate General seeks no relief for himself or for the State. The ultimate beneficiaries of an order under the Act may be a known or unknown class of persons who are likely to be subjected to harassment by a vexatious litigant. The Advocate General is expected to discharge his obligations in a very objective manner bearing in mind the high purpose that he is required to serve. We should dot therefore proceed on the premise that