Time is not the essence of a contract for sale of land, and the vendors' title is not a question properly arising in a specific performance suit.

1. The 2nd defendant for self and as power-of-attorney-holder of defendants 2 to 5 entered into an agreement Ext. Al dated 23-5-1977 for sale of the suit property 1 acre 11 cents in extent to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 60,000/-. The payment of advance Rs. 20,000/-is acknowledged in Ext. Al. As per the terms of the agreement the balance Rs. 40,000/- is to be paid and the sale transaction is to be completed within a period of two months. The property belonged to Kuncheria T. Marattukulam, father of defendants 1 to 4 and the husband of the 5th defendant. Ext. Al asserts that on the death of Kuncheria T. Marattukulam the property has devolved on defendants 1 to 5. The plaintiff issued notice Ext. A4 on 21-10-1977 demanding performance of the contract by the defendants. Exts. AS to A8 are subsequent notices for the same purpose. On failure of the defendants to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff filed the present suit for specific performance of the contract. The defendants raised various pleas in answer to the plaint. For the purpose of this appeal it is necessary to advert only to two of the contentions raised by the defendants viz , (1) that the time fixed for performance of the contract had expired before the plaintiff made a demand and hence the defendants are not bound to perform the contract, and (2) on the death of

Kuncheria T. Marattukulam the property devolved on his wife and all his children including four daughters who are not parties to the agreement, and hence the defendants could not convey full title to the property as agreed to between the parties. The court below overruled all the contentions of the defendants and decreed specific performance of the contract directing defendants 1 to 5 to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on the plaintiff paying the balance consideration of Rs. 40,000/-within two months from the date of the decree. The 2nd defendant has appealed against this decree.

2. Counsel for the appellant submits that the defendants are not bound to execute the sale deed as the time fixed for completion of the transaction expired on 23-7-1977 and a demand for performance was made by Ext. A4 notice only on 21-10-1977. It is well settled that time is not the essence of a contract for sale of land and an agreement can be enforced even after the time stipulated between the parties (vide Govind Prasad Chaturvedi v. Hari Dutt Shastri and another, AIR 1977 SC 1005, and Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palanisami, AIR 1967 SC 868).

3. The more formidable contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant is on point No. 2 stated above. Kuncberia died in 1974 and his assets devolved on his wife and all his children. The Travancore Christian Succession Act, 1072 stood repealed on the coming into force of the Part B States (Law) Act, 1951 and intestate succession to the estate of a deceased Indian Christian is governed by Chapter II of Part V of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The daughters are also legal heirs of the deceased and defendants 1 to 5 are not competent to convey full title to the property in terms of the agreement Ext. Al. It is also contended that the plaintiff had not pleaded his willingness to accept an assignment of the share due to defendants 1 to 5 in terms of S.12 of the Specific Relief Act and no such relief can also be granted in the present suit.

4. It is true that intestate succession to the assets of a deceased Indian Christian dying after the commencement of the Part B States (Law) Act, 1951 is governed by Chapter II of Part V of the Indian Succession Act as held by the Supreme Court in Mary Roy and Others v. State of Kerala and Others (1986 KLT 508). The further question is whether a decree for specific performance can be passed against defendants 1 to 5 who had agreed to convey the property to the plaintiff. Counsel for the appellant relies on the decision in Balmukand v. Kamla Wati (AIR 1964 SC 1385) in support of the proposition that a decree cannot be