The certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory supersedes the report given by the Public Analyst, and the superseded report cannot be revived for any purpose.

1. Petitioner is the accused in S. T. 125/1986 on the file of First Class Magistrate's Court, Moovattupuzha. He was prosecuted by Food Inspector for offence punishable under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for having sold sesame oil which was found to be adulterated on analysis. The report submitted by the Public Analyst is Form No. III is dated 16-7-1986. On the application of the accused another sample taken by the Food Inspector was sent to the Central Food Laboratory. The Director of Central Food Laboratory issued certificate dated 16-12-1986 in Form II. While examining Dw-1, Sri Nandakumar, Associate Professor in Chemistry, attached to the Kerala Agricultural University, the accused wanted to refer to the Public Analyst's report and to compare the same with the certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory to explain the differences on account of the delay caused in getting the sample analysed. The Assistant Public Prosecutor objected to the said course. He contended that when the certificate in Form II has been received the Public Analyst's report in Form III cannot be referred to for any purpose. This objection was heard and the learned Magistrate passed a detailed order on 24-3-1988. That order states:

"the prayer of the learned defence counsel to allow him to put questions with regard to the contents of the certificates and compare the result noticed is disallowed."

This order is under challenge in this Criminal M.C.

2. S.13(3) of the Act reads:

"The certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory (under sub-section (2-B) shall supersede the report given by the public analyst under subsection (1)."

In all ordinary cases primarily the language employed by the Legislature is the determining factor in understanding the provision of law. The words used in the statute must bear a plain meaning unless the context otherwise requires. The meaning of the word 'supersede' used in this clause must bear the ordinary plain meaning. As per Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary the word 'supersede' means:

"to desist or refrain from: to override: to set aside: to set aside in favour of another: to come or put in the room of, to replace."

As per the Random House Dictionary of English Language its meaning is:

"(1) to replace in power, authority, effectiveness etc. (2) to set aside or cause to be set aside as void, useless or obsolete, usually in favour of something mentioned, (3) to succeed to the position, function, office, etc. of; supplant."

Therefore when the Section says that the certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory shall supersede the report given by the Public Analyst it means that the Certificate of the Director of Central Food Laboratory will replace or supplant the report given by the Public Analyst. When the Director's certificate has so replaced or supplanted the report given by the Public Analyst, can the report in Form III be referred to for any purpose in a proceeding under the Act? This aspect was considered by a Larger Bench of this court consisting of Five Judges in Mathukutty v. State of Kerala (1987 (2) KLT 867). This court stated the law as:

"Even if there is wide variation between the Director's certificate and Analyst's report, the former supersedes the latter and the superseded report cannot be revived for any purpose. (emphasis added)

This means that the superseded report of the Public Analyst cannot be made use of for any purpose, not even for explaining the variation between the Director's Certificate and the Analyst's report. It will not be open to the court to look at the report of the Public Analyst and rely on the details mentioned therein for any purpose.

3. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Charanji Lal v. State of Punjab (1983 FAJ 435) argued that the view taken by the Larger Bench in the decision referre