The case established the principle that local authorities have a statutory duty to abate nuisances, such as dangerous trees, and can be held liable for damages resulting from their negligence in discharging this duty.

1. This second appeal is at the instance of a local authority the Quilon Municipality. It arises out of a suit, by an inhabitant of that Municipality. It is for damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of an aged tree falling on his building. The owners of the property in which the dangerous tree stood in its extra-ordinary pose, are defendants 2 to to 8, the legal heirs of one Aha aimed Khan. The Municipality was sought to be made liable for its gross default in the discharge of its statutory duty cast under the Municipalities Act in relation to the abatement of a nuisance caused by a dangerous tree.

2. The trial court decreed the suit and awarded a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as damages. There were two appeals, one by the first defendant-Municipality and the other by the legal heirs of Ahammed Khan. The appellate court affirmed the liability of the defendants but restricted the damages to Rs. 3,000/-.

3. The Municipality seeks to dispute its very liability by presenting this second appeal.

4. Counsel for the appellant rightly did not question the quantum of damages payable. (If at all, the lower appellate court has only erred in denying compensation for the damages actually sustained by the collapse of the brick work in the compound wall belonging to the plaintiff. It is unnecessary to refer to that aspect in greater detail in this second appeal.)

5. The plaintiff adduced adequate documentary evidence Exts. Al to A12 and examined 6 witnesses on his side including himself as Pw.1. Apart from producing the notice issued by counselor) behalf of the plaintiff to Ahammed Khan, the appellant-Municipality did not take any effort in adducing evidence on its side. (Doubtless, this is a conduct which those who are in charge of the administration of local bodies should probe into. Those who are responsible for such a grievous default, should not be let off, without being impressed upon about the accountability and responsibility in relation to their elementary duty as public servants. The Director of Municipalities and Government would do well, to consider these aspects in all its seriousness and issue necessary directives to prevent recurrence of such irresponsible conduct on the part of the officials of the primary units of democracy. A copy of the judgment would be forwarded to the Secretary to Government, Local Authorities Department and also to the Director of Municipalities to ensure expeditious action in that behalf.

6. The following are the established facts: The coconut tree in the neighbouring property posed a distinct danger. That it was 80 ft. long was indicative of its age and infirmity. That it leaned towards the building, would have alerted everyone to a realisation of imminent danger. If out side prodding was necessary, that was furnished by the complaint Ext. AS given to the Municipality on 9-6-1978. The immobility on the part of the defendant for over one year, made the plaintiff send a second representation, Ext. A7 dated 18-6-1979. The Councillors, who have given evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, have spoken about the issue having been discussed before the Council and about the decision having been taken for directing the cutting of the dangerous tree. As noted earlier, there is no evidence adduced on behalf of the Municipality to indicate the action actually taken by it. The Court is kept in the dark about the deliberations of the Council or the implementation of any decision taken by it. The tree tried to hold on for many months more. Alas! it fell down on 16-5-1980. Its last resting place was the plaintiff's terrace. There was physical impact to the building and mental one to the inhabitants. The plaintiff preserved the last sight of the tree tragedy by taking a photograph, Ext. A10.

7. Defendants declined to indemnify the plaintiff against the damages sustained by him, though the demand in that behalf had been made repeatedly. This led to the suit. The suit, as not earlier, now stands decreed, concurrentl