The main legal point established in the judgment is the need for satisfaction of a prima facie case, bonafide contention between the parties, and serious question to be tried in the grant of interlocutory relief of injunction.

1. Appellants herein filed a suit for injunction restraining the defendants from committing trespass into the suit property. They also filed I. A. No. 139 of 1984 seeking an order of temporary injunction. The court originally allowed the injunction application. However, this court in CMA. Nos. 68 and 73 of 1985 set aside the order and remanded the injunction application for fresh consideration. After remand the court below heard the parties and dismissed the injunction application. This order is now challenged by the plaintiffs.

2. The court below has dismissed the injunction application on the ground that plaintiffs have not made out a prima facie case of possession. According to learned counsel for the appellants, the correct approach is not to find out whether the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case; the correct approach is to find out whether there is a bonafide contention between the parties or a serious question to be tried. According to learned counsel, there is a bonafide contention between the parties and a serious question to be tried and therefore an order of injunction should have been passed. In support of this argument, learned counsel has strongly relied on the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Joshua v. Geevarghese Mar Dioscorus (1979-85 KUC. 243). It is pointed out that the Division Bench overruled the decision of a learned single judge of this court in Vellakutty v. Karthiyani (1967 KLT. 667).

3. In Vellakutty's case (1967 KLT 667) this court relied on an observation of the Allahabad High Court in Abdul Qudeer v. Municipal Board, Moradabad (AIR 1955 All. 414) to the effect that:

"The granting of an injunction being a very serious matter in that it restrains the opposite parties from the exercise of their rights, the Court does not issue the injunction unless it is thoroughly satisfied that there is a prima facie case in favour of the applicant".

(emphasis supplied) The court also observed:

"It is also clear that a prima facie case implies the probability of the plaintiff obtaining a relief on the material placed before the court at that stage".

The Division Bench after considering the decision of the Supreme Court in United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India and others (AIR 1981 SC 1426). observations of Lord Diplock in American Cynamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. (1975 (1) All. ER 504) at page 509 and in N.M. L. Ltd. v. Woods (1979 (1) W. L. R. (1294) and also the decisions in Bishambat Nath v. Municipal Committee (AIR 1926 Lah. 589), Brajendra Nath v. Sm. Kashi (AIR 1946 Patna 177) and a decision of a learned single judge of this court in C.R.P. No. 1856 of 1976, held:

"In the light of the discussion of the question we are of the view that the standard set out in Vellakutty's case supra (1967 KLT 667) is unduly rigid and the approach to be made has been indicated by the Supreme Court in United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India (AIR 1981 SC 1426) at p. 1440 and also by the Lahore High Court in Bishambat Nath v. Municipal Committee (AIR 1926 Lahore 589) and the Patna High Court in Brajandranath v Sm. Kashi (AIR 1946 Patna 177) and by Chandrasekhara Menon, J in CRP No. 1856 of 1976". (emphasis supplied)

4. There is no controversy that the standard set out in Vellakutty's case (1967 KLT 667) indeed is unduly rigid. But the question is whether the decision in Joshua's case (1979-85 KUC 243) contra indicates the need for satisfaction on the part of the court that a prima facie case is made out on the materials before it at that stage. In the Lahore decision (AIR 1926 Lah. 589) it was stated that it is sufficient if the person applying for an injunction has a case which needs consideration and in the Allahabad decision (AIR 1955 All. 414) it was stated that it is sufficient if the plaintiff can show that he has a clear question to raise. More or less to the same effect was the observation in CRP No. 1856 of 1976. This court in Joshua's case (1979-85 KUC 243) noticed the following observation of Lord D