The Act provided a self-contained code for tax imposition and dispute resolution, ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts, and emphasizing limited judicial review of special tribunal decisions.

1. The Kerala Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1963 (the Act) for the first time imposed a tax on all passengers, luggages and goods carried by any stage carriage and on all goods transported by goods vehicles. It was made payable by the operator who has to collect and remit the same. Operator is defined in the Act as to include owner or the person having possession or control of the vehicle or any person whose name is entered in the permit as holder thereof. Regional Transport Officer (D2) is the prescribed officer who has to issue demand notice and collect the amount. His demand notice is appealable before the District Collector (first defendant is the State represented by the District Collector). No further provision is there to challenge his order even though the order is not described as final.

2. There is no specific provision in the Act barring suits or other proceedings against the Government except a period of limitation fixed under S.22. That period is applicable to suits, prosecutions or other proceedings in Civil or Criminal Courts against officers and servants also. All acts done in good faith by officers and servants are saved from liability before courts under S.21(2). For criminal prosecution against them sanction of Government is also made a condition precedent under S.21(1). This is the scheme of the Act. A reading of the various provisions of the Act shows that in the matter of demand and collection the action of the Regional Transport Officer subjected to the appellate jurisdiction of the District Collector was not intended to be interfered with by anybody provided they acted in good faith within bounds.

3. Third respondent Mr. Namboodiri was the permit holder of the stage carriage involved in this case. When second defendant demanded tax from him, he denied liability stating that the vehicle was transferred to the plaintiff. Second defendant rejected that objection. But in appeal the District Collector after issuing notice to the plaintiff and hearing him also, passed a considered order based on relevant materials finding that the vehicle has been transferred to the plaintiff and he is in possession and control. He was made liable by Ext. Al order which is challenged in this suit as null and void. A declaration to that effect and injunction from collection of tax are claimed on the grounds of collusion, absence of authority, want of materials and absence of liability on his part. All these contentions are found against on the merits and according to me rightly. The District Collector had authority and he acted within bounds observing all the legal formalities required. It is not for the civil court to sit in judgment over his order. Therefore normally the other contentions do not arise. But elaborate arguments were addressed before me on the question of jurisdiction and hence I feel bound to consider it.

4. The trail court rejected the contention of the defendants that the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted, but dismissed the suit for the reason that Mr. Namboodiri who is a necessary party was not impleaded. On non joinder the appellate judge agreed with the trial court ignoring his order allowing an application to implead Mr. Namboodiri. On the back of the impleading application now there are two orders by the District Judge, one allowing the same and impleading Namboodiri and another dismissing it without reviewing the earlier order. Judgment also refers to the non-impleading and dismissal of the impleading application as a ground for dismissal of the appeal. At the same time the District Judge disagreed with the trial court and found that the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted. Now, Mr. Namboodiri is the third respondent before me. He is represented by a counsel who took part in the arguments. Impleading him at the appellate stage is impleading for all subsequent stages in all the courts and it cannot be erased by what the District Judge said or did.

5. Now, t