The Enquiry Officer's role in questioning witnesses did not violate the principles of natural justice, and the workman's failure to raise grievances during the enquiry indicated no prejudice. The court also found that the punishment imposed was not disproportionate to the offence.

1. Petitioner, a dismissed workman, challenges Ext. P1 Award of the Labour Court, upholding an order dismissing petitioner from service. Petitioner, while working as a Blacksmith under second respondent, is alleged to have beaten up one Mohanan Pillai, Supervisor, under whom he was working. It would appear that the Supervisor allotted work to petitioner, but he refused to do it. When he was asked to do the work, it is said, petitioner assaulted the Supervisor, causing injuries on him. After a domestic enquiry, petitioner was dismissed from service. The Labour Court by Ext. P1 Award, affirmed the order of dismissal.

2. Learned counsel for petitioner challenges the Award as also the order of dismissal, mainly if not solely, on the ground that the Enquiry Officer acted as the Presenting Officer, by putting questions to witnesses. Thus he has acted, as Prosecutor and judge according to counsel, and for this reason, the order of dismissal is vitiated. To sustain his contention, counsel invited my attention to the decision in Bharath Electronics Ltd. v. K. Kasi (I. L. R.1987 Karnataka 366). In that case, the learned judge took the view that, enquiry would be invalid if in the absence of a Presenting Officer, the enquiring authority played the role of Presenting Officer.

3. Learned counsel for respondents invited my attention to a line of decisions, taking the view that the Enquiry Officer putting questions, will not be violative of the principles of natural justice. In Mulchandani Electrical & Radio Industries v. The workmen (AIR 1975 SC 2125) the Supreme Court took the view that the enquiring authority is entitled to question the witnesses, so long as the delinquent employee is permitted to cross-examine the witnesses, and that this will not violate the enquiry or make it unfair. Thus, the role ascribed to the Enquiry Officer, will not taint the findings. In Workmen in Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Madras v. Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Madras (1970(1) LLJ 26), the Supreme Court held that the Enquiry Officer-putting questions to witnesses in the absence of a Presenting Officer separately appointed, will not vitiate the enquiry. In Machinery Manufacturing Corporation Ltd. v. Pal (P. N.) and others (1963 (1) L. L. J. 131), the Calcutta High Court held that, charge of bias on the ground that the Enquiry Officer himself cross-examined the witnesses cannot be sustained.

4. There is another aspect, deserving notice. Petitioner had no grievance on this score at any time during the enquiry. Records of proceedings reveal that the Enquiry Officer put a specific question to petitioner at the close of enquiry, whether he had any grievance about conduct of the enquiry. His answer was that, he had no grievance. Petitioner was represented at the enquiry. If petitioner had no grievance about the manner in which the enquiry was held or about the person who conducted the enquiry, there was no prejudice. If there was no prejudice infact, there is no prejudice in law.

5. A vague plea of prejudice cannot be countenanced. The requirements of natural justice cannot be put in a strait jacket. Prejudice, must be real, not presumed, unless there is a statutory mandate, that is violated. As observed by the Supreme Court of India in K. L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India and Ors. (AIR 1984 SC 273):

"the rules of natural justice are flexible and cannot be put on any rigid formula It has to be established that prejudice has been caused to the appellant by the procedural fault". In the instant case, petitioner had no case any time hitherto that the procedure followed led to any prejudice as far as he was concerned. It is not stated how prejudice was occasioned or in what manner.

6. It is difficult to accede to the further submission that the Enquiry Officer is in the position of a judge. In A.N.D' Silva v. Union of India (AIR 1962 SC 1130), the Supreme Court stated:

"Neither the conclusion on the evidence, nor the punishment which the enquiring authority