Judges : U.L.BHAT
KUNJUKRISHNAN NAIR - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF KERALA - Respondent
Case No : O.P. No. 8032 of 1988
Decided On : 11/18/1988
Advocates Appeared :
P. Krishnamoorthy; N.N. Venkitachalam; For Petitioner K.R.B. Kaimal; For Respondents
Termination - Government Pleader - R.17 of the Rules - Art.14, 16 of the Constitution, S.23 of the Contract Act - West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh (1985) 3 SCC 116, Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd v. Brojo Nath (AIR 1986 SC 1571), O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd (AIR 1987 SC 111) - State of J. & K. v. T. N. Khosa (AIR. 1974 SC. 1)
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, appointed as Additional Government Pleader, challenges the termination of his appointment and contends that R.17 of the Rules is unconstitutional and void under S.23 of the Contract Act.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the relationship between the State and law officers is not purely master and servant, but one of mutual confidence and trust, justifying special treatment of law officers. The termination was deemed not to be arbitrary or opposed to public policy.
Issues: The issues involved the constitutionality of R.17 of the Rules, the nature of the relationship between the State and law officers, and the presence of malafides in the termination.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the termination of a law officer's appointment is justified by the fiduciary nature of the client-counsel relationship between the State and law officer, and that R.17 cannot be regarded as discriminatory or arbitrary. The termination was deemed to involve no legal grievance.
Final Decision: The Original Petition was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.
1. Petitioner was appointed Additional Government Pleader, Quilon by the State Government on 3-7-1986 for a period of three years from the date of assumption of charge. The order makes it clear that the conditions of service, duties, remuneration etc. of the petitioner will be governed by the rules issued on 25-1-1978 as amended from time to time. He joined duty on 14-7-1986. By Ext. P3 dated 13-9-1988. State Government issued notice to him that his appointment shall stand terminated on the expiry of one month from the date of receipt of the notice. The termination is now challenged. In the process petitioner also contends that R.17 of the Rules aforesaid is unconstitutional being violative of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution and being void under S.23 of the Contract Act.
2. R.17 of the Rules aforesaid reads as follows:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the Government may terminate the appointment of any Government Law Officer, other than a Special Government Pleader or Special Public Prosecutor at any time before the expiry of the term of his appointment without assigning any reason therefor. Provided that such termination shall not be effected unless one month's notice in writing has been given to him."
It is in accordance with this rule that the petitioner's appointment has been terminated with one month's notice.
3. Learned counsel would contend that the power vested in the Government under R.17 is an arbitrary power contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and unconstitutional. Learned counsel submitted that the office of the Government Pleader or an Additional Government Pleader is an office under the State and for this purpose, relied on the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Mrs Baby George v. State of Kerala (1973 KLJ. 923).
4. In the above case constitutionality of the procedure adopted by the State Government in proceeding to appoint Government Pleaders in the High Court without inviting applications and based only on the panel submitted by the Advocate General was challenged as violative of Art.16 of the Constitution. In that connection, the Division Bench held that the office of the Government Pleader is an office under the State for the purpose of Art.16 of toe Constitution. However, the court sustained the procedure adopted observing as follows:
"While selections made openly and in the full glare of publicity afford the best guarantee against arbitrariness and capaciousness of actions put through in the secrecy of an office-chamber, there may well be certain highly specialised and sensitive posts or offices selections to which may not altogether be appropriately made by the 'open-market' method. It is here that we have take note too, of the decision in In Re An Advocate (AIR 1962 SC 1337) where an advocate's action in offering his services for the office of Counsel on record for a State was condemned as unprofessional. That seems to rule out calling for applications in this sphere as inconsistent with the ethics of a noble and learned profession, In the light of the above principles, we are unable to endorse the broad submission of the petitioners' counsel that the right to have vacancies advertised and thereafter to make applications for the post is an essential ingredient of Art.16(1) of the Constitution.
Judicial decisions have also taken the view that an appointment by selection, or by a process otherwise than by calling for applications, does not necessarily offend Art.16; See Dr. S.T. Venkataiah Thimmaiah v. State of Mysore (AIR 1969 Mysore 186), Dr. Kartar Singh Rai v. State of Punjab (AIR 1970 Punjab 112) and the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sri Bholanath Srivastava and others (AIR 1972 All 460). In the last of these, the appointment of Government Pleaders made on the recommendation of the Advocate-General was sustained as not violative of Art.16 of the Constitution
We think that the fact that the appointment of Government Pleader is made out of a panel recommended by
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