The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement of exclusive possession and the intent to exclude others for criminal trespass under S.441 I.P.C., and the duty of the court to assess the materials and grant leave for proceedings against a receiver appointed by court.

1. The dispute centres round "Sangham" theatre at Calicut which belongs to Sahida. Hemalatha is in occupation under a transaction claimed by her to be a lease, but contended by Sahida to be only a licence. Before the Subordinate Judge, Calicut, Sahida sued Hemalatha in O.S. No. 159 of 1977 for getting possession after terminating the arrangement. On the application of Sahida the respondent, a retired Deputy Collector, was appointed as receiver. But he was allowed to take only symbolic possession subject to the occupation of Hemalatha. Sahida took up the matter in C.M.A. No.1 of 1981 before this Court. By judgment dated 2-6-1981, the C. M. Appeal was disposed of holding that Hemalatha is only a licensee and the receiver is entitled to terminate the licence and take possession. But that was made subject to accounts being settled by the trial court after hearing both sides and amounts, if any, found due to Hemalatha being paid.

2. Receiver, who was the 5th respondent in the C. M. Appeal, took possession of the theatre and the premises at 11.30 A. M. on 3-6-1981 and submitted the original of Ext. P2 report before the Sub Judge. Though on the complaint of Hemalatha the police registered a case, it was referred as mistake of fact. Hence the appellant (husband of Hemalatha) filed C. C. No. 107 of 1981 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Calicut against the receiver as first accused and Sahida as second accused for offences punishable under S.448 and 506 (ii) I. P. C. Both of them sought to quash the complaint by filing S.482 petitions before this Court unsuccessfully. Sahida went upto the Supreme Court in special leave. But leave was refused on the undertaking of the complainant that the case against Sahida will be withdrawn. Accordingly, the case against her was withdrawn and she was discharged. The case proceeded only against the receiver. He was ultimately acquitted. Present appeal is by the complainant against the acquittal.

3. The allegation in the complaint is that is violation of the provisions of Ext. P2 judgment of this court in C. M. A. No.1 of 1981, the receiver made forcible entry, took forcible possession by putting an employee PW 4 to fear of death and snatching away the keys and then went away after locking the premises. On the merits of the allegations and evidence, S.448 was repelled for the reason that even though the action of the respondent is unauthorised involving civil liability, it will not amount to criminal trespass.

4. Limitations on interference and grounds justifying interference in an appeal against acquittal are now well settled by a host of authoritative judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court and High Courts. It is not necessary to cite authorities. In view of the presumption of innocence, until the guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, which is not weakened but only strengthened by the acquittal, and the exclusive right of the accused and not the prosecution to get the benefit of all reasonable doubts, and on account of the cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence that even at the risk of many guilty persons escaping conviction one innocent man should not be convicted, the courts are bound to accept the view in favour of the accused in preference to the one in favour of the prosecution, when two equally reasonable views are possible on the evidence. When such a view was taken by the trial court which had the added advantage of seeing the witnesses in action and watching their demeanour, that will not be lightly interfered with by the appellate court. But that does not mean that the appellate court has no right to interfere. Right of the appellate court is the same whether the appeal is against conviction or acquittal. Difference is only in the approach. In order to foreclose the right of interference the view adopted by the trial court must be one reasonably possible from the evidence. If so possibility of another equally reasonable view by reappraisal will n