The specific denial of execution and the burden of proof on the party asserting notice of a sub-mortgage were central legal principles established in the judgment.

1. An obstructor succeeded in two courts below in his resistance against delivery of a property covered by the decree. The obstructor is none other than the brother of the first judgment-debtor. Other judgment-debtors are the children of the first judgment-debtor. This second appeal is by the decree-holder.

2. The appellant obtained the decree for redemption of two usufructuary mortgages in respect of a land having thirty eight cents in extent. All the steps so far adopted by the decree-holder to get possession of the mortgaged property did not fructify. The turn in the fight is consequent on the obstruction made when the Amin went to effect delivery of possession of the property. Execution court upheld the obstructors claim in regard to thirty one cents, but rejected the claim in regard to the balance area of seven cents on which a building is situate. Both the obstructor and the decree-holder challenged the said order of the execution court. It was the obstructor who filed the appeal in the court below. Then the decree-holder preferred cross-objections in that appeal. The lower appellate court confirmed the order subject one modification i. e., the execution court was directed to refer the claim of the obstructor that he is a kudikidappukaran to the Land Tribunal. Hence this second appeal.

3. The decree for redemption passed by the trial court against the judgment-debtors was confirmed in appeal. Two among the judgment-debtors raised objections during execution proceedings that the decree is void as against them on the ground that they were wrongly shown as minors in the suit. Those objections were overruled against which a Civil Revision Petition was filed in this Court, but that revision was also dismissed. Then another judgment-debtor filed a suit challenging the decree as having fraudulently obtained in collusion between his mother (first judgment-debtor) and the decree-holder. That strategy also did not succeed. Ultimately, the decree-holder reached the stage when the court ordered delivery of property. It was then that the respondent herein, who is brother of the first judgment-debtor, obstructed. The obstruction is based on Ext. B1 mortgage deed dated 1-2-1965, purported to have been executed by the first judgment-debtor on her behalf as well as on behalf of her minor children. (The decree was passed by the trial court on 17-10-1975). An alternate contention was raised by the obstructor that he is a kudikidappukaran in respect of another building situate in the property described in Ext. Bl. Even after upholding the obstructor's right over thirty one cents, the lower appellate court wanted to pursue the matter further and hence remitted the case to the execution court directing it to refer the question of kudikidappu to the Land Tribunal.

4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that Ext. B1 mortgage deed ought not have been looked into in this case as it was not legally proved. S.68 of the Evidence Act is pressed into service, which says that "if a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution". S.59 of the Transfer of Property Act says that a mortgage can be effected only by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and at tested by at least two witnesses, unless the principal money secured by the mortgage is less than one hundred rupees. The amount purported to be secured by Ext. B1 mortgage deed is one hundred rupees. Admittedly no attestor was called to prove Ext. B1 mortgage deed. It is on the aforesaid premise that the contention was raised regarding the bar against Ext. B1. Such contention raised in the first appellate court was repelled by the learned Sub Judge relying on the proviso to S.68 of the Evidence Act. According to the Sub Judge, "Ext. B1 is not a will but only a registered mortgage deed and in this case it was challenged not by the pe